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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE FIRST SELF-EVIDENT
TRUTH: EQUALITY AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN
INTERPRETING THE RELIGION CLAUSES
- Jay Alan Sekulow"
James Matthew Henderson, Sr.**
Kevin E. Broyles
[T]hey came first for the Communists, and I didn't speak up
because I wasn't a Communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they
came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I
wasn 't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics,
and I didn't speak up because I was a Protestant. Then they
came for me, and by that time no one was left to speak up.
- Martin Niemoller
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The First Self-Evident Truth
The sad legacy of Nazi Germany is unquestionably the clearest testa-
ment of the dangers of discriminatory government classifications. With the
United States' constitutional commitment to equality, one is tempted to feel
confident that the slightest discrimination is subject to strong public scrutiny
and criticism, if not judicial redress, even if the discrimination is far less
horrific than the atrocities of the Second World War. That aspiration, how-
ever, underestimates the subtlety of inequality and overestimates the visi-
bility of its consequences. Indeed, it is not blind, ignorant hatred alone that
fuels discrimination; nor does unquestioning acceptance of just legal form
snuff out its flame. Ideas and convictions are the first defenses against tyr-
anny. Without the protections of the First Amendment, all other liberties are
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hollow, including the equality embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
John Adams, Charles Carroll, Thomas Jefferson, and John Penn were
among the many signers of the Declaration of Independence who knew it to
be self-evident "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable rights, [and] that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."2 Roger Williams and Martin Luther
King, Jr. knew the importance of equality.' Despite their best efforts and
our nation's continual discovery and acceptance of the breadth of the first
"self-evident" truth, one last, great vestige of government-directed discrimi-
nation still persists and is sanctioned under law: discrimination on the basis
of religion or religious belief. The equal right of religious people to think
differently, entertain unique beliefs, and speak up against immoral and evil
action, even if directed by the government, has always been the first defense
against tyranny. This is the first truth, which Hitler understood and which,
unfortunately, became evident to Martin Niemoller only through experience.
B. Religious Classifications
The Supreme Court has sought repeatedly to guard against religious
classifications that place religious individuals at an advantage because of
their religion, and thus violate the Establishment Clause.4 At the same time,
the Court has warned against the use of religious classifications to shackle
religious citizens with unique disabilities or to exclude them from the equal
enjoyment of certain general government benefits.' Such government action
violates the Free Exercise Clause. The Court, however, has discarded the
original meaning of the Religion Clauses,6 and has ignored too frequently
2 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
Williams observed:
It is the will and command of God, that (since the coming of his Son the Lord
Jesus) a permission of the most Paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or Antichristian con-
sciences and worships, be granted to all men in all Nations and Countries: and
they are only to be fought against with that Sword which is only (in Soul matters)
able to conquer, to wit, the Sword of God's Spirit, the Word of God.
ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION (1644), reprinted in 3 THE
COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 3 (Russell & Russell 1963).
Similarly, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. noted:
An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a
minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference
made legal. By the same token, a just law is a code that a majority compels a
minority to follow and that it is willing to follow itself. This is sameness made
legal.
MARTIN L. KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 83
(1964).
4 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
6 The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment state that "Congress shall make no
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the Clauses' relationship to the rest of the Constitution. Consequently, the
Court's religious freedom cases are often logically incomprehensible, its
First Amendment jurisprudence irreconcilable from one case to the next.
The reasoning suffers from a lack of intelligible consistency and constitu-
tional congruency. Despite the Court's window-dressing, its treatment of the
Religion Clauses hardly provides a completely integrated jurisprudence.
The parallel state of confusion in which the Court's establishment and
free exercise cases languish is the result of a departure from the original
intent of the framers and ratifiers of the First Amendment. First, the Su-
preme Court trespassed unwisely in the people's sphere of authority, judi-
cially amending the Constitution to apply the First Amendment to the
states.7 While this was, and is, a black-eye upon the institutional integrity
and constitutional authority of the Court, it has become arguably less contro-
versial, from a practical standpoint, considering the religious diversity of the
United States. The Court's second departure from the historical understand-
ing of the Constitution is not ignored so easily. In tossing away the First
Amendment's federal flavor, the Court unwittingly ignored the key ingredi-
ent in the Framers' concept of religious liberty-the overriding principle of
equality of religious choices. Finally, with this omission, the Court began to
depart from the concept of the First Amendment Religion Clauses as two
prohibitions working together to ensure the equal protection of what has
been called the "First Liberty": the freedom to make voluntary choices re-
garding religious exercise. As early champions of freedom in the New
World understood, without religious liberty, no other freedoms could thrive.
Thus, while the Court's unfaithfulness to the text and history of the Consti-
tution by departing from the federalism limit on the First Amendment has
led only to a jurisprudential disaster, its latter two indiscretions, left unre-
pentant, have led to a jurisprudential and practical nightmare, breeding legal
confusion and government-enforced religious discrimination.
This Article addresses the confusion created by the Court's departure
from the original meaning of the Religion Clauses. That confusion is ana-
lyzed by examining the Court's establishment and free exercise cases. Most
of the scrutiny is focused on the establishment test expounded in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,9 and its application to government treatment of religion and reli-
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
' See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the First Amend-
ment so as to apply equally to the states).
8 See WILLIAM L. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (1986).
9 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In accordance with the Lemon test, in order to survive Es-
tablishment Clause scrutiny, government action must: (1) reflect a clearly secular legis-
lative purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
(3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
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gious citizens in government-controlled education. Part II scrutinizes
Lemon's logic as applied by lower courts, and as avoided by the Supreme
Court in numerous cases where side-stepping Lemon's requirements seemed
prudential and efficient to the justices. The Court's free exercise jurispru-
dence is then examined, revealing much of the same logical and historical
unfaithfulness prevalent in Lemon. In Part III, an alternative test is proposed,
one emphasizing equality as the overriding principle to guide adjudication of
Religion Clauses cases. This principle is faithful to the Religion Clauses'
original purpose of protecting equality of religious choice, a familiar goal of
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence prior to Lemon, and a useful
principle in subsequent cases where the Court has wished to free itself from
the burden of Lemon's illogic. Similarly, the equality principle is equally
cognizable in cases traditionally categorized as raising issues of religious
free exercise. The equal protection of all citizens, religious or nonreligious,
in voluntarily choosing whether to exercise religion, is only possible with an
adequate understanding of the equality principle as it applies to issues of
religious voluntarism. When the unique aspect of religious exercise is con-
sidered, religious classifications that protect religious liberty are shown to be
consistent with, and in furtherance of, the equality principle.
The Religion Clauses contain two prohibitions that exist to preserve the
liberty to make voluntary choices regarding religion. These prohibitions are
designed to protect against two distinct types of government actions which
interfere with religious liberty. In order to attain its purpose of protecting
the religious rights of all Americans, the prohibitions of the Religious Claus-
es must be read together. This Article will give the Religion Clauses a com-
prehensive and intelligible interpretation that is consistent with its original
purpose and in harmony with the other clauses of the First Amendment.
II. A JURISPRUDENCE OF CHANCE
A. The Need to Define Religion's Role in the Marketplace
Since Everson v. Board of Education,'" the Court has grappled fre-
quently with governmental activity within the religious sphere. In recent
years, the Lemon test has been used most consistently to judge alleged vio-
lations of the Establishment Clause. Set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman," the
test requires that to survive constitutional scrutiny, government action must:
10 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, the Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey statute
that permitted government reimbursement of public transportation costs of students in
parochial schools. Id. at 18.
1 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding unconstitutional Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
statutes that permitted direct government support of parochial schools in the form of
teachers' salary supplements, textbooks, and secular instructional materials).
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(1) have a secular legislative purpose; (2) have a principal or primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion. 2 The Court applies the Lemon test only
haphazardly; in a growing number of cases, the Court has resolved Estab-
lishment Clause claims without any substantive discussion of the Lemon test
or any apparent application of the test to the decision. 3 Yet, Lemon lives
on, leaving the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence in disarray,
resulting in a torturous interpretation of the limits within which government
and religion may interact.
Members of the Supreme Court have warned of the inherent dangers of
a jurisprudence that lacks sound historical and traditional grounding, resting
instead on catchy phrases and neat tests. In McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 4 Justice Reed noted that a "rule of law should not be drawn from a
figure of speech." 5 Justice Jackson agreed that without guarded caution,
the Court would "make the legal 'wall of separation between church and
state' as winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson
for the University he founded."' 6 A year prior to penning the Lemon test,
Chief Justice Burger explained that "[t]he considerable internal inconsistency
in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been
too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in
relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general princi-
ples."'7 Even while introducing the Lemon test, the Chief Justice warned
that the Court should not "engage in a legalistic minuet in which precise
rules and forms must govern.' '
With equal consistency, the Court has warned against government hostil-
ity towards its citizens because of their religion. In Zorach v. Clauson,9
the Court discussed the impermissibility of governmental hostility toward
religion. Dismissing the idea that government may not accommodate the
"spiritual needs" of the citizenry, the Court declared:
To hold that [government] may not [accommodate religion]
12 Id. at 612-13.
13 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994); see also Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252
(1982) (holding that the Lemon test is not necessary for analysis of patent discrimina-
tion against a church).
14 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
"S Id. at 247 (Reed, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 237-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
" Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
IS Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
'9 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a released-time program for religious instruction
away from public school property).
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would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the
government show a callous indifference to religious groups.
That would be preferring those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe. Government may not finance
religious groups, nor undertake religious instruction nor
blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institu-
tions to force one or some religion on any person. But we
find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary
for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its
weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of reli-
gious influence."
This view was reiterated in Lynch v. Donnelly,2 in which the Court de-
clared that the Constitution "forbids hostility" toward any religion. Final-
ly, in McDaniel v. Paty,23 Justice Brennan agreed to strike down a provi-
sion that barred clergy from serving as state legislators, noting that it vio-
lated the Establishment Clause because it manifested "patent hostility to-
ward, not neutrality respecting, religion," and had the "primary effect" of
inhibiting religion.24
The religious heritage of the American people also dictates that govern-
ment not be hostile to religion. In Zorach, the Court noted:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as
one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs
and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We
sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no
partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish accord-
ing to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dog-
ma.
2 5
The Court reiterated this view eleven years later, when it observed:
The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that
there was a God and that the unalienable rights of man were
rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the
Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself. This back-
20 Id. at 314.
21 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
22 Id. at 673.
23 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
24 Id. at 636 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
21 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.
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ground is evidenced today in our public life through the
continuance in our oaths of office from the Presidency to the
Alderman of the final supplication, "So help me God."26
When the government shows hostility toward religion it is "at war with our
national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free
exercise of religion." 7
Hostility towards religion robs American democratic institutions of a
major source of the values that justify their existence. The American politi-
cal tradition presupposes a government that does not seek to shape its
people's values, but rather is itself shaped by them.28 Accordingly, religion
traditionally has played a central role in the development of public virtue:
Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the
significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people
believe in and worship God and that many of our legal,
political and personal values derive historically from reli-
gious teachings. Government must inevitably take cognizance
of the existence of religion. 9
Governmental hostility towards religion is antithetical to the American expe-
rience; without a respect for and understanding of religion, the very fabric
of western society, its history, and the moral authority of many of its laws
are cut adrift.3°
26 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963).
McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211-12). Similarly, in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664
(1970), the Court declared:
Few concepts are more deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life, begin-
ning with pre-Revolutionary colonial times, than for the government to exercise at
the very least this kind of benevolent neutrality toward churches and religious
exercise generally so long as none was favored over others and none suffered
interference.
Id. at 676-77 (validating tax exemptions for religious property).
28 This tradition is expressed in our nation's law, which "knows no heresy, and is
committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect." Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871).
29 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
30 As one commentator noted:
True political liberty is the child of religious liberty. It must look to freedom of
the soul as a child does to its mother for birth, protection, and provision. Political
anarchy is the usual result of a people seeking full liberty by ignoring or neglect-
ing the support which religion brings to man's moral nature. It is a long road to
political liberty, but it is a road which has run parallel with religious liberty.
1995] 357
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B. Driving Religion Out of the Marketplace
Despite opinions eschewing even the appearance of hostility to religion,
the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence readily lends itself to
the fomenting of such hostility. Lemon's shallow roots in our history of
religious freedom, and the ease with which its prongs may be used to bump
religious expression and liberty into a second-class status in the marketplace
of ideas, have brought about the very confusion and hostility that it sought
to avoid. The justices have refused to listen to their own devout counsel.
Five justices of the current Court have expressed their discomfort with one
aspect or another of the Lemon test,3 yet it continues to plague the Court's
Religion Clauses jurisprudence. Lemon's longevity, despite its indefensibili-
ty, is probably due to its usefulness. As Justice Scalia explained:
When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we in-
voke it; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we
ignore it entirely. Sometimes, we take a middle course, call-
ing its three prongs "no more than helpful signposts." Such a
docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least
in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need
him.32
Those instances in which the Court has ignored Lemon suggest that some
Justices have been tempted to apply an equality principle at various times
since Lemon's creation.33 The cases in which the Court has invoked Lem-
on, or paid it homage by deferring to its "helpful" guidance, demonstrate the
inequality the sometimes untamed test tolerates at the expense of religious
citizens.
Even though the Supreme Court has never enshrined the analysis pre-
sented in Lemon as a rigid test for resolving Establishment Clause claims,
lower courts have made the Lemon test the sole means for winnowing out
ARTHUR B. STRICKLAND, ROGER WILLIAMS: PROPHET AND PIONEER OF SOUL-LIBERTY
140 (1919).
3" See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2498-500 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113
S. Ct. 2414, 2149-50 (1993) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in judgment);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) (Kennedy, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., White and Scalia, JJ., concurring in part); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 107-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32 Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citations
omitted).
33 See infra part III.B.
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instances in which government has become excessively entangled with reli-
gion. Unfortunately, rigid and mechanical application of the vaguely under-
standable yet easily manipulable Lemon test often leads to absurd results.
These results reflect the breadth of confusion that plagues courts that reflex-
ively apply the Lemon test to every sort of Establishment Clause case. Al-
though some of these decisions seem amusing, they all bear the scent of that
"relentless extirpation of all contact between government and religion,"
which inaccurately or inadequately reflects "the history or the purpose of the
Establishment Clause." 4 Such absurdity is not required by the text of the
First Amendment, nor was it intended by its Framers.
Currently the Court has before it a case that demonstrates the problems
with singling out religion and religious adherents for special disabilities in
the provision of government services. Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univer-
sity of Virginia35 demonstrates that, in light of the logical inconsistencies of
Lemon, a new test for interpreting the Religion Clauses is needed. Perhaps
the Court will view Rosenberger as "the proper case ... to bring [its] Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence back to... the proper track-government
impartiality, not animosity, towards religion. ' 36 Lemon and its progeny,
"cases ... so hostile to our national tradition of accommodation, 37 should
be clarified or overruled where appropriate so as to recognize the principle
of neutrality through equality embodied in the thinking of the Founders, the
traditions of this nation, and the text of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
1. The Secular Purpose Prong
The Supreme Court treats Lemon's secular purpose prerequisite as toler-
ating legislation if it has any secular purpose.38 Although the Court has
used the purpose prong to defeat government action only thiee times since
Lemon,39 it poses a significant threat of confusing lower courts and abusing
religious liberty.
Justice O'Connor noted recently that "[w]hat makes accommodation
permissible, even praiseworthy, is ... that the government is accommodat-
34 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
35 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir.), cert. granted 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994). For a brief descrip-
tion of Rosenberger, see infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
36 Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); see also id. at
2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
" Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (noting that "a statute must
be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion") (emphasis
added).
" See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-89 (1987); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56;
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
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ing a deeply held belief."' 4° When, however, exemptions are provided on a
nondiscriminatory basis, the purpose of the legislation is to remove burdens
on religious freedom; thus, the government's action "advances" the cause of
religion. The secular purpose prong, however, must take account of the fact
that "intentional governmental advancement of religion is sometimes re-
quired by the Free Exercise Clause."'4' As Justice O'Connor explained, "[i]t
is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose when the manifest
objective of a statute is to facilitate the free exercise of religion by lifting a
government-imposed burden. '42 Accordingly, Lemon's purpose prong, in
addition to confusing First Amendment jurisprudence, actually induces ten-
sion between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Legis-
lators are given a multitude of blind choices without guidance, leaving ef-
forts at accommodation futile because of the uncertain status of legislative
countenance of minority beliefs under the Establishment Clause.43
Not only has the purpose prong "made such a maze of the Establishment
Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can only
guess what motives will be held unconstitutional, 44 but courts have found
that "discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is...
almost always an impossible task. '45 This is adequately demonstrated by an
examination of the facts in Edwards v. Aguillard6 and Stone v. Graham.47
In Edwards, Louisiana State Senator Bill Keith sponsored a bill that re-
quired the teaching of evolution and creation science whenever one or the
other was taught. 48 After the bill was adopted into law, it was challenged
as "establishing" religion.49 Even though Justice Scalia thoroughly perused
the legislative and trial records to cite numerous examples of secular legisla-
tive purposes,50 the majority found these purposes unwise at best, and at
worst a sham,5 if the goal was to achieve "academic freedom."52 The ma-
jority dismissed Senator Keith's statements on the legislative floor and at
4 Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
41 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41 See, e.g., Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(attributing the State's unconstitutional attempt at accommodation to prior Supreme
Court rulings); id. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (same).
44 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"" 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
47 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
48 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581, 587.
49 Id. at 581-82.
5o Id. at 619-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5' Wallace, 472 U.S. at 586-87.
52 Id. at 587-89.
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trial that attributed a sincere secular purpose to the legislation.53 Interest-
ingly, the justices in the majority were the same justices who two years
earlier had been willing to rest their decision in Wallace v. Jaffree54 on the
word of Alabama State Senator Donald Holmes.55 Like Senator Keith, Sen-
ator Holmes was the sponsor of a bill involving religion and the public
schools.56 Unlike Keith, however, Senator Holmes stated that his bill, pro-
viding for a period of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer in public
schools, had "no other purpose" than to aid religion by returning voluntary
prayer to public school.57 In Edwards, the justices ignored clear legislative
evidence, resting its decision on the conclusion that the stated secular pur-
pose, "academic freedom," was improvidently sought after, and thus not a
secular purpose at all.58 In Wallace, however, the Court deferred to the
"unrebutted evidence of legislative intent."59 In light of the Court's applica-
tion of the purpose prong in these two cases, legislators from Louisiana and
Alabama, along with everyone else having to reconcile the Court's reason-
ing, must be left in silent awe of Lemon's versatility.60
In the hands of the zealous lower courts, Lemon has justified outlandish,
and sometimes hypocritical, results. In Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univer-
sity of Virginia,6 the Fourth Circuit demonstrated the extent to which the
3 Id. at 620-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
See id. at 39 (majority opinion by Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Powell, JJ.); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 579 (majority opinion by Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
56 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-57.
57 Id. at 57.
5 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-87.
9 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 58. As Justice Powell observed, in the context of Establish-
ment Clause issues, "interference with the decisions of [government] authorities is war-
ranted only when the purpose for their decisions is clearly religious." Edwards, 482
U.S. at 605 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Apparently, in both Edwards and
Wallace, the "clear" and "unrebutted" evidence of purpose allowed the Court to skirt
Lemon's permitted justification of "any" secular purpose.
6 The legislators from Louisiana must have been particularly confused. The Court in
Wallace noted that "[t]he legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of
course, quite different from merely protecting every student's right to engage in volun-
tary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday," Wallace,
472 U.S. at 59, suggesting that it is the thought behind legislation that counts. Neverthe-
less, the Court in Edwards revealed that it is not how you play the legislative game, but
whether the Court desires your legislation to win or lose. The Court's pole vault from
Wallace to Edwards brings to mind the counsel of Spinoza: "He who seeks to regulate
everything by law, is more likely to arouse vices than reform them." BENEDICT DE
SPINOZA, TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS, reprinted in 1 THE CHIEF WORKS OF
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA 261 (R.E. Elwes trans., Dover 1955).
61 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994).
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purpose prong may be manipulated. Ronald Rosenberger challenged the
University of Virginia's policy of excluding religious groups from eligibility
for reimbursement of certain operating expenses that were provided to other
groups and organizations from a fund supported by mandatory full-time
student contributions.6' After concluding that the university's discrimination
was a presumptive burden on the enjoyment of a government benefit in
violation of the Free Speech and Press Clauses, the Fourth Circuit deter-
mined nonetheless that a fear of violating the Establishment Clause was
sufficiently compelling to justify the unconstitutional condition.63
Analyzing Lemon to demonstrate the possible Establishment Clause
problems of equal funding for religious organizations, the court in
Rosenberger deferred to the university's conclusion that the funding of reli-
gious activities would not further its "educational mission."' " The conclu-
sion was made even though religious discussion and education was a part of
the university's academic curriculum. 6 Under this application of Lemon's
purpose prong, the university was allowed to define religion out of the mar-
ketplace of ideas. After approving this discriminatory subterfuge, the court
then suggested that the university's "secular purpose" was to avoid "an
establishment of religion at the institution. '66 As long as the discrimination
was carried out "in a manner consistent with the educational purpose of the
University [which was conveniently defined to allow such discrimination] as
well as with state and federal law, '67 which the court interpreted to require
the discrimination because of the Establishment Clause, there was no First
Amendment problem. 68 Accordingly, the discrimination did not offend the
Establishment Clause because the "secular purpose" was to discriminate
against religion in order to avoid offending the Establishment Clause.69
The Supreme Court's failure to recognize "that determining the subjec-
62 Id. at 270-71. The amount of funding given to groups depended on the group's
size, the benefits conferred on the university community by the group, and the group's
financial self-sufficiency. Id. at 271. The guiding principle in administering the fund
was to promote the educational mission of the university. Id. The policy excluded reli-
gious organizations, fraternities and sororities, political organizations, and groups with
exclusionary membership policies from funding. Id. In addition to the aforementioned
organizations, "[t]he following expenditures and activities also [were] excluded by the
guidelines: (1) honoraria or similar fees; (2) religious activities; (3) social entertainment
and related expenses; (4) philanthropic contributions and activities; and (5) political
activities." Id. (footnote omitted).
63 Id. at 287.
6 Id. at 284.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 283 (quoting the university's "Student Activity Fee Statement of Purpose").
61 Id. at 284.
69 Id.
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tive intent of legislators is a perilous enterprise"" was compounded in
McDaniel v. Paty.7  In McDaniel, the plurality held that a Tennessee stat-
ute unconstitutionally abridged the free exercise of religion by disqualifying
members of the clergy from service as legislators.72 Yet, if Lemon's pur-
pose prong is read broadly to forbid religious motivation, not only clergy-
legislators but all legislators must shed their religious faith before voting.
While a pharmacist, engineer, or lawyer may bring the expertise garnished
from their professions to tasks such as drafting and voting on legislation, a
person of deep religious faith may not. If Lemon is taken to its logical con-
clusion, the pharmacist must also dispense with religious motivations. This
is simply an example of the most basic problem with Lemon's purpose
prong; its results depend on a fictional formula for deciding the ratio of
religious motives to other motives for government action.73
2. The Effect Prong
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the "principal or pri-
mary effect [of government action] must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion."74 Since Lemon, the Supreme Court has only once struck
down government action as "inhibiting" religion. 75 This is not surprising,
as a true and faithful application of the effects prong is almost impossible
without striking down all government action containing religious classifica-
tions. As Justice Frankfurter explained:
By its nature, religion-in the comprehensive sense in which
the Constitution uses that word-is an aspect of human
thought and action which profoundly relates the life of man
to the world in which he lives. Religious beliefs pervade, and
70 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 638 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
435 U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality op.).
72 Id. at 629. Justice Brennan agreed that "because the challenged provision requires
appellant to purchase his right to engage in the ministry by sacrificing his candidacy it
impairs the free exercise of his religion." Id. at 634 (Brennan, J., concurring in judg-
ment).
13 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that it is impossi-
ble to determine purpose of a statute because each individual legislator may have sever-
al motives for supporting legislation).
4 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). Even in Larson, the Court observed
that its application of the Lemon test was superfluous to the outcome of the case. Id. at
252. Indeed, the conclusion that the government's action inhibited religion was based on
an overriding principle of equality among religious denominations gleaned from the
writings of James Madison and the Court's prior missives regarding "neutrality." Id. at
245-46.
1995] 363
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
religious institutions have traditionally regulated, virtually all
human activity .... State codes and the dictates of faith
touch the same activities. Both aim at human good, and in
their respective views of what is good for man they may
concur or they may conflict. No constitutional command
which leaves religion free can avoid this quality of inter-
play.
76
Similarly, as an eight member Court noted in School District v. Schempp:77
It can be truly said.., that today, as in the beginning, our
national life reflects a religious people who, in the words of
Madison, are "earnestly praying, as ... in duty bound, that
the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe ... guide them into
every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing.]"78
Clearly, every government action will, in some respect, either advance or
inhibit those institutions which pervade virtually all human activity and
those beliefs which guide its citizens into every measure which may be
worthy. Like the purpose prong, Lemon's effect prong is unworkable as a
model for distinguishing between those government actions that only act to
advance religion by its establishment, and those actions that advance reli-
gious freedom through its accommodation.
In Larson v. Valente,79 the Supreme Court reviewed a state program
that exempted certain religious organizations, based upon the source of
contributions, from the registration and reporting requirements of a charita-
ble solicitation act.8" In finding that the exemption violated the Establish-
ment Clause by discriminating against religious organizations that did not
qualify for the exemption, the Court denounced denominational preferences
76 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461-62 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in judgment); see also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (noting that "[n]either government nor this Court can or should ignore
the significance of the fact that ... many of our legal, political and personal values
derive historically from religious teachings"); cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
669 (1970) (stating that "[s]hort of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there
is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference").
7' 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
78 Id. at 213 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
79 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
80 Id. at 230-32. The exemption was only given to those religious organizations that
received greater than one half of their contributions from members or affiliated orga-
nizations. Id. at 231-32.
364 [Vol. 4:1
1995] RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE FIRST SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH 365
as inconsistent with the free exercise of religion." Noting that government
must treat all religions equally,82 the Court suggested that the act violated
the Lemon test, but only after hedging Lemon as applicable to actions
touching upon religion generally, rather than actions discriminating among
religions.83 This suggestion revealed the Court's strategy; selective applica-
tion of the test permits the Court to avoid the restraints of Lemon. The
Court was willing to recognize that public aid of religion A inhibits religion
B and all other religions not subsidized, but was not willing to admit that
public aid of idea or philosophy A inhibits religion A and B and all other
religious ideas not subsidized. The Court's supreme tinkering with logic and
language is evident from what is not said in Larson. While citing several
cases for precedential proclamations of equality among religions, the Court
omitted conspicuously the language from those cases warning that
nonreligion should not be preferred over religion in general." After the
Court's ellipses are removed, it becomes clear that government funding of
every idea, organization, or citizen to the exclusion of religion and religious
citizens who otherwise qualify for government funding inhibits religion in
the same way that funding religion A inhibits religion B. This indefensible
81 Id. at 255.
82 Id. at 246 (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("[N]o state
can 'pass laws which aid one religion' or that 'prefer one religion over another."); see
also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion .... ); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 305
(Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that
government ... effect no favoritism among sects ... and that it work deterrence of no
religious belief."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("[G]overnment must
be neutral when it comes to competition between sects.").
83 Larson, 456 U.S. at 252.
' See, e.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 ("The First Amendment mandates govern-
mental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.");
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 218 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 18); id. at 220 (quoting
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961)) ("[N]either a State nor the Federal Gov-
ernment ... can constitutionally ... pass laws or impose requirements which aid all
religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief
in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs."); id. at
225 (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314) ("We agree of course that the State may not
establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing
hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do
believe."'); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 (To hold that the state may not "encourage[] reli-
gious instruction or cooperate[] with religious authorities ... would be to find in the
Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religion
groups[,] . . . preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.");
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (stating that government cannot "exclude individual[s] ...
because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legis-
lation"); id. at 18 (holding that the First Amendment "requires the state to be a [sic]
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers").
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twist of Lemon is one more 'reason the test has produced logical inconsisten-
cies within the Court's jurisprudence.
The more fundamental concern is that when lower courts zealously and
reflexively apply the Supreme Court's discriminatory, yet authoritative logic
found in Lemon's effect prong, religious citizens are singled out for discrim-
ination in the provision of government benefits. Government action often
benefits a wide range of activities and institutions that include religious
bodies and individuals. In Rosenberger, the Fourth Circuit approved the
University of Virginia's policy of taking fourteen dollars per semester from
every full-time student to support a "wide variety of student organizations,
activities, and publications,"85 so long as those activities were not, inter
alia, political or religious.86, Amazingly, the Fourth Circuit held that this
discrimination does not "inhibit" religion.87
The university subsidizes those groups that check their political and
religious beliefs at the door. Those refusing to do so are allowed on the
playing field, but they are forced to shoulder personally the cost of their
own participation, while helping to subsidize all other groups. In the eco-
nomic marketplace, the notion that unequal subsidization would not inhibit a
taxed but unsubsidized competitor is not only unpersuasive, it is poor eco-
nomic theory. In the marketplace of ideas, the theory is no more persuasive
or legitimate. As Justice Brennan has explained: "The Nation's future de-
pends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,' [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection."88 In Rosenberger, the selective
provision of general funds was at the heart of the university's "authoritative
selection" process. Religious and political ideas had to compete with philo-
sophical and cultural ideas, among others, after giving them an assisted head
start.89 It is astoundingly illogical to conclude that the university's policy
did not inhibit religion. 0
85 Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 270 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994).
86 Id. at 271.
87 Id. at 285.
88 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States
v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (alteration in original)).
89 One wonders if the University of Virginia would feel slighted in the least if it
were compelled to contribute money to the student recruitment efforts of Duke, North
Carolina, and Georgetown, and then join the race to prove itself the more worthy insti-
tution of higher learning to the top high school students in America. Thomas Jefferson,
the university's founder, certainly would have felt slighted, believing that "to compel a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbe-
lieves is sinful and tyrannical." An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785),
reprinted in VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Michie 1986).
" The Fourth Circuit's astonishing conclusion that the university would be advanc-
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This conclusion is even more surprising when the consistency of the
Fourth Circuit's logic is put to the test. The analysis in Rosenberger pro-
vides the most compelling evidence of the utter hypocrisy produced by
Lemon's application. After painstakingly explaining how the university's
provision of support and "sustenance of religion in [several] incidental re-
spects [did] not ... inhibit religion,"91 the court suggested that the use of
"public funds to support a publication so clearly engaged in the propagation
of particular religious doctrines would constitute a patent Establishment
Clause violation."92 The court failed to explain how the university's exten-
sive support of the other students' clear propagating was not also a "patent"
violation of the same clause.93
While Lemon's internal inconsistency is unsurprising, if not entirely
expected, the Fourth Circuit took Lemon where few enterprising courts have
gone before. The court held that the university had "penalize[d]" the reli-
gious students freedom of speech by "withholding ... an otherwise discre-
tionary benefit."94 This "create[d] an uneven playing field on which the
advantage [was] tilted towards [organizations] engaged in wholly secular
modes of expression." 5 However, after finding such discrimination uncon-
stitutional under the Free Speech Clause, the Fourth Circuit then used
Lemon's mutated interpretation of the Establishment Clause to uphold the
university's actions, essentially repealing the Free Speech Clause.96 Miracu-
ing religion by treating religious groups equally, Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 285, is further
evidence of Lemon's invitation to the bizarre. It is as if the university and the lower
courts believe religious adherents do not need to be treated equally to compete on par
with other philosophical and scientific views in the quest to prove that their religious
tenets and ideas are the "truth" of which Justice Brennan wrote. See supra note 88 and
accompanying text. Religious citizens must have some hidden fountain of wealth that
never runs dry, but from the public fountain all nonreligious citizens and groups may
drink, and the government even draws the water. Perhaps the Commonwealth of Virgin-
ia believes in a miraculous Divinity after all.
9' Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 285.
92 Id.
9' In its entanglement analysis, the court simply brushed aside any dispute, emphati-
cally concluding that unlike general in-kind support, the equal provision of cash support
is "a beast of an entirely different color." Id. at 286. The more apt metaphor is that the
latter is simply the third head on a beast the Supreme Court has encountered before. In
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981), and Zobrest v. School District, 113
S. Ct. 2462, 2466-69 (1993), two cases recognized by the Fourth Circuit in its
Rosenberger analysis, the Supreme Court simply tamed two heads of the beast. The
Fourth Circuit continued to let the third head tug in an opposite direction of the other
two, providing the internal inconsistency in its analysis of both Lemon's effect and
entanglement prongs.
9 Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 281.
Id. (emphasis added).
96 Id. at 287.
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lously, the "uneven playing field" the court decried was transformed into
"neutrality" under Lemon.97 Thus, under the Fourth Circuit's analysis, Lem-
on consumes not only the Establishment Clause, but the also the Free
Speech Clause.9"
The Supreme Court clearly has held that "[t]he Establishment Clause
does not license government to treat religion and those who teach or prac-
tice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American
ideals and therefore subject to unique disabilities."" Lemon's effect prong,
however, gives lower courts license to deny religion or religious people
equality in the provision of general government benefits. The Supreme
Court then attempts to revoke this license in piecemeal fashion, as it pur-
ports to correct the confusion with each new clarification of Lemon." The
language of Lemon lives on, and its inherent confusion reigns in lower
courts that torturously misapply it to the detriment of religion and religious
adherents.
3. The Entanglement Prong
The third and most tangled web of the Lemon test prohibits the exces-
sive entanglement of government and religion.'0 ' As noted above, prevent-
ing all entanglement of religion and government is impossible; it is equally
unwise. As Justice Brewer explained in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
9' Id. at 284-85.
98 The Fourth Circuit completed the demolition with its dicta that the Free Exercise
Clause would also support the conclusions reached in the discussion of freedom of
speech. Id. at 283 n.31. Sadly, the Equal Protection Clause appears to be Lemon's next
victim. See id. at 287-88 (dismissing equal protection claim upon finding that discrimi-
nation was not product of a discriminatory intent); cf id. at 281-82 (justifying the dif-
ferential treatment of religious organizations by recognizing the Commonwealth's com-
pelling purpose of avoiding an Establishment Clause violation). While the Fourth Cir-
cuit allows the Commonwealth to eat the cake inconsistent logic has given it, religious
citizens are left to shiver outside the government's castle as others enjoy the liberties
Lemon, in the hands of lower courts, has reserved for the nonreligious aristocracy.
" Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (quoting McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)).
"o See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2141, 2148 (1993); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249-50; Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,
607-09 (1988); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-
87 (1986); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273-74.
10' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). Justice O'Connor and Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist have attributed "many of the inconsistencies in [the Court's] Establish-
ment Clause decisions" to the entanglement web. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429
(1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Wallace v. Jaffiee, 472 U.S. 38, 109-110
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
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States:10 2
Every constitution of every one of the... States contains
language which either directly or by clear implication recog-
nizes a profound reverence for religion and an assumption
that its influence in all human affairs is essential to the well
being of the community.
There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a
universal language pervading them all, having one meaning;
they affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation."3
Justice Douglas reiterated these truths sixty years later, when he stated:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being .... When the state encourages religious
instruction or cooperates with religious authorities ... it
follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the
religious nature of our people and accommodates the public
service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not
would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the
government show a callous indifference to religious groups.
That would be preferring those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe."
This historical understanding finds contemporary support from Justice
Scalia, who recently observed that "those who adopted our Constitution...
believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion are a public good ....
Unsurprisingly, then, indifference to 'religion in general' is not what our
cases, both old and recent, demand."' 5 Thus, as justices of the Court have
long recognized, some entanglement of the civil and religious is not only
inevitable, but quite welcome.
The qualifier "excessive" does not save Lemon's third prong from ab-
surd and confusing results. Indeed, even before Lemon, the Court had recog-
nized the paradox inherent in asking government to maneuver one way or
the other to avoid excessive entanglement with religion."6 In Widmar v.
102 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
103 Id. at 468, 470.
104 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
o Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2151
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
"o See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (acknowledging that elimi-
nation of tax exemptions for religious organizations would tend to expand, not contract,
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Vincent,"' the Court noted that to exclude all religious groups from a priv-
ilege granted to others would risk greater entanglement because government
"would need to determine which words and activities fall within 'religious
worship and religious teaching.' This alone could prove 'an impossible task
in an age where many and various beliefs meet the constitutional definition
of religion."" 8 Entanglement, then, can mean any number of things. To
those adhering to the Lemon formula, it has meant most often either political
divisiveness over sensitive issues of religious funding or other support of
religion, or close administrative involvement of government and reli-
gion.109
In Aguilar v. Felton,"' the Court reviewed a New York program that
used federal education money earmarked for the remedial education of chil-
dren of low-income families to pay the salaries of regular public educators
who provided such instruction on parochial school premises."' Only
13.2% of the eligible students in 1981-1982 were private school stu-
dents."' Of those, at least 92% attended religious schools."3 Six taxpay-
ers filed suit, challenging the inclusion of the private religious school stu-
dents in the program as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Finding that
the program violated the Establishment Clause by entangling government
and religion, the Court noted that several supervisory precautions were taken
to ensure that the effect of the program did not advance religion, thus violat-
ing the Establishment Clause under the Lemon entanglement prong."'
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan explained that the entangle-
ment present in the New York program raised two concerns. First, the pub-
licly funded "aid [was] provided in a pervasively sectarian environment,"
requiring "a permanent and pervasive state presence" in the parochial
schools.' Apparently, refusing to allow the private religious schools and
their students to participate equally with others in a government program
supported by federal and state taxes would save the schools from
"endur[ing] the ongoing presence of state personnel ... guard[ing] against
government involvement with religion).
107 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
o Id. at 272 n.l 1 (quoting O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 936 (1979)).
'o See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
110 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
" Id. at 404-06. The instruction included "remedial reading, reading skills, remedial
mathematics, English as a second language, and guidance services." Id. at 406.
112 Id.
113 Id.
14 Id. at 409. Paradoxically, in School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985),
Aguilar's companion case, the Court struck down a similar program in Michigan as vio-
lating the effect prong of Lemon because there were no precautions to prevent the ad-
vancement of religion. Id. at 386-92.
"' Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412-13.
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the infiltration of religious thought" in the program."6 Second, the daily
decisions the government personnel would have to make might offend the
religious schools; thus, "the dangers of political divisiveness along religious
lines increase[d]."" 7 It was, however, logical divisiveness with the Court's
reasoning that initiated vehement attacks of the entanglement analysis from
the dissenters.
While then Justice Rehnquist noted the obvious "'Catch-22' paradox...
whereby aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the supervi-
sion itself is held to cause an entanglement,""' Justice O'Connor wrote a
more comprehensive assault on the majority's interpretation. Aside from the
realization that the entanglement of religion and government was always a
possibility, she exposed the Court's reliance on political divisiveness as
illogical. Justice O'Connor found "[i]t ... curious indeed to base ... inter-
pretation of the Constitution on speculation as to the likelihood of a phe-
nomenon which the parties may create merely by prosecuting a lawsuit.""''
The Court's entanglement analysis left the government in the same incurable
position as the other two prongs of Lemon. As Justice White had predicted:
The Court ... creates an insoluble paradox for the State and
the parochial schools. The State cannot finance secular in-
struction if it permits religion to be taught in the same class-
room; but if it exacts a promise that religion not be so
taught-a promise the school and its teachers are quite will-
ing and on this record able to give-and enforces it, it is
then entangled in the "no entanglement" aspect of the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 2 °
In Board of Education v. Grumet,2' the Court's most recent foray into
interpretation of the Religion Clauses, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
recognized another unfortunate paradox for legislators, this one created by
the Court's unpredictable jurisprudence in this area. Grumet involved the
village of Kiryas Joel in New York, a community consisting entirely of
adherents to the Satmar Hasidim form of Judaism.'22 Most of the children
116 Id. at 413.
"1 Id. at 414.
118 Id. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
" Id. at 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
120 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J. concurring in part); see also Aguilar, 473 U.S.
at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wallace, 472
U.S. at 109 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the entanglement prong can, in
certain circumstances, create an "insoluable [sic] paradox").
121 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
122 Id. at 2485.
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were educated in private schools that did not offer services for handicapped
children.' Beginning in 1984, the local public school district provided
services for the Satmar Hasidists' disabled children in an annex to one of
the private schools.'24 Unfortunately, these services were provided pursuant
to the same type of state program that the Supreme Court struck down in
Aguilar.'25 The Satmar Hasidists' disabled children were then sent to an-
other school district, where they were frightened and traumatized by being
in a strange environment with radically different students." 6 To accommo-
date this unique situation and resolve a protracted political problem, the
New York legislature created a school district drawn up along the Kiryas
Joel village lines. 27 Although the statute did not turn over the school dis-
trict to a Satmar Hasidist religious organization, the school board was made
up exclusively of such adherents, because the village was made up entirely
of those adhering to this faith. 1 8 The New York State School Boards As-
sociation and others brought suit, claiming that the accommodation was "an
unconstitutional establishment of religion."'29
Fearing that future religious groups requiring such an accommodation
would not be guaranteed equal treatment, the Court held that the special
school district was an unconstitutional establishment of religion.3 ° Al-
though the Court did not say what would suffice to guarantee future equal
treatment, a neutral process of evaluating and granting appropriate, similar
accommodations would appear to be enough."' The Court did suggest that
a history of granting similar accommodations might be adequate.' Justice
Scalia, however, noted in dissent that had the legislature granted such
accommodations, "each of [the accommodations] would have been attacked
(and invalidated) for the same reason"-there would have been no prior
history.' While Justice Scalia's criticism simply highlighted one more
inconsistency engendered by the majority's maternal instinct toward Lemon,
Justice O'Connor remarked on the practical difficulties caused by the
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. The Satmar Hasidists "speak Yiddish as their primary language; eschew televi-
sion, radio, and English-language publications; and dress in distinctive ways that include
headcoverings and special garments for boys and modest dresses for girls." Id.
127 Id. at 2486.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 2491.
... See id.
132 Id.
"' Id. at 2513 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia observed: "I am sure the
Court has in mind some way around this chicken-and-egg problem. Perhaps the legisla-
ture could name the first four school districts in pectore." Id.
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Court's unwillingness to revisit a comprehensive interpretation of the Reli-
gion Clause. It was, she observed, "the Court's insistence on disfavoring
religion in Aguilar that led New York to favor it here."''
The disfavor for religion in Supreme Court cases,'35 however, is mild
compared to the astonishing government discrimination against religion and
religious citizens that is justified by lower courts which zealously apply the
Court's interpretation of Lemon. The annoying and recurring paradox creat-
ed by the Lemon prongs is aptly demonstrated in the Fourth Circuit's entan-
glement analysis in Rosenberger. While the Fourth Circuit held that the
university's refusal to grant a general benefit to student religious organiza-
tions was justified by the entanglement prong of Lemon,'36 it found no
problem in granting those benefits to such "cultural organizations" as the
Muslim Students Association and the Jewish Law Students Association.'37
Curiously, the Fourth Circuit's entanglement analysis rested largely on the
"potential for political divisiveness related to religious belief and prac-
tice."' The court's conclusion that religious divisiveness is somehow
more dangerous than philosophical or cultural divisiveness is surely novel.
The university must have feared that "facilitating discussion which fosters
an atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints"'3
was somehow a call to arms. The Fourth Circuit failed to explain how the
Jewish and Muslim student groups could be trusted to live in peace and
harmony, while equal treatment of religious students was believed to be the
first step toward Holy War. 4 To employ Justice O'Connor's example, the
"' Id. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
135 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Ball, 473 U.S. at 373; Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402; Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Levitt v. Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971).
136 Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 287 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994).
'" Id. at 288.
138 Id. at 286.
139 Id. at 272 (quoting the constitution of Wide Awake Productions).
Perhaps the court believed that Jews and Muslims have a milder history of "divi-
siveness." Of course, such a distinction between the "political divisiveness" of religion
and the "cultural divisiveness" between Jews and Muslims is not only practical fantasy,
but historical nonsense.
After more than 200 years, the Commonwealth of Virginia has successfully come
full circle in Rosenberger. As the Supreme Court has noted, James Madison's views
"accurately reflect[] the spirit and purpose of the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment." McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 624 (1978). To condemn the discrimination in
which the university was engaged, one need only quote paragraph four of Madison's
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fact that Ronald Rosenberger has been in litigation with the university for
over four years because of the university's discrimination against religion
and religious students, not because of its funding, provides the final and
most emphatic example of Lemon's "insoluble paradox.""'
C. Free Exercise of Religion
Although this Article is mainly critical of the illogical interpretation of
the Establishment Clause, the Constitution's commitment to religious free
exercise has enjoyed no better treatment. This Article will not give an ex-
haustive treatment of the Court's free exercise cases, partly because of the
greater consistency among the cases, at least until recently, and partly be-
cause the Court's indiscretions in this area have been fewer and less disas-
trous. Perhaps this is because a majoritarian democracy in a religious, if not
Christian, nation, although prone to take actions that are inevitably suspect
under Lemon, is less likely to take actions that will directly infringe upon
religious freedom. Nevertheless, the Court's treatment of religious free exer-
cise must be addressed if a comprehensive interpretation of the Religion
Clauses is to be understood. After all, the Framers believed the goal of
religious liberty would not be complete without prohibiting Congress from
infringing upon the exercise of religion.'42 Thus, religious free exercise is
Memorial and Remonstrance:
[T]he bill violates that equality which ought to be the basis of every law, and
which is more indispensible [sic], in proportion as the validity or expediency of
any law is more liable to be impeached. If "all men are by nature equally free and
independent," all men are to be considered as entering into Society on equal con-
ditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore retaining no less, one than an-
other, of their natural rights.... As the Bill violates equality by subjecting some
to peculiar burdens; so it violates the same principle, by granting to others pecu-
liar exemptions.
JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(June 20, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1784-1786, at 295,
300 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973). As Justice Brennan has explained:
The Framers were not concerned with the effects of certain incidental aids to
individual worshippers which come about as by-products of general and nondis-
criminatory welfare programs. If such benefits serve to make easier or less expen-
sive the practice of a particular creed, or of all religions, it can hardly be said that
the purpose of the program is in any way religious, or that the consequence of its
nondiscriminatory application is to create the forbidden degree of interdependence
between secular and sectarian institutions.
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 302-03 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
141 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., concurring in part).
142 See U.S. CONST. amend I.
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extremely important, whether protected by a political majority because the
particular religions are important to it, or by the courts because they are
entrusted to do so by the First Amendment.
Compared to its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court's treatment of free exercise was, at one time, doctrinally simplistic. If
a person could prove that a government action burdened a sincerely held
religious belief, and the government could not in turn prove that it had a
compelling interest, unrelated to religion, in not providing an exemption for
the religious dissenter, the fundamental right to religious free exercise
trumped the government's action.'43 When the religious citizen won, the
courts would then force the government to provide the exemption requested.
For example, in Sherbert v. Verner,'44 a Seventh-Day Adventist was dis-
charged from her employment for refusing to work on Saturday, the day of
her sabbath. 45 South Carolina denied her unemployment compensation be-
cause she refused to accept suitable work, all of which also required her to
work on Saturday.' 6 The Supreme Court articulated a two-part test to
guide interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. First, "[i]f the purpose or
effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to
discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally inval-
id even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect."' 47
Only after finding that the South Carolina law impeded the Saturday sabbath
observer's religion by compelling her to choose between unemployment
benefits and her religion, did the Court turn to the second part of the test:
"[W]hether some compelling state interest . . . in [enforcing the statute]
justifie[d] the substantial infringement of [the religious observer's] First
Amendment right.... [I]n this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for per-
missible limitation.""48 Balancing the competing claims, the Court held
'4' Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
144 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
141 Id. at 399.
'46 Id. at 399-401.
' Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (rejecting
claims of Orthodox Jews that Sunday closing laws restricted their religious freedom
because they were civilly prohibited from working on Sundays, and thus economically
compelled to violate their religious duty to not work on Saturdays, the Jewish sabbath)).
141 Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). Note the illogi-
cal use of language by the Court. First, the Court says the law is constitutionally invalid
if it violates free exercise rights. See id. at 404. Then, the Court suggests the gravest of
dangers to compelling governmental interests can validate a constitutionally invalid law.
Id. at 406. This unfaithfulness to language is what created the numerous problems with
the Lemon test. To be consistent, the Court's two-part test should remain, but if one
proves a sincerely held and actually burdened religious belief or practice, it should only
be recognized as constitutionally protected if the government does not have a compel-
ling interest which outweighs the interest in the religious exercise or belief. Thus, the
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that the state could not apply its Saturday work requirement in this circum-
stance. 1
49
Apart from the overemphasis on religious belief as opposed to conduct
motivated by religious belief,5° the Sherbert opinion provided a relatively
sound approach to free exercise analysis. Unfortunately, since Sherbert, the
Court has refused to require any free exercise exemptions in any context
other than unemployment compensation. 5' In Employment Division v.
Smith, "'52 five members of the Supreme Court sharpened the teeth of this
distinction, suggesting that true religious liberty existed only in so far as
employment rights were concerned. In Smith, two members of the Native
American Church were denied unemployment compensation after being fired
from their jobs for ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug.'53 Unemploy-
ment compensation was denied because the two were discharged for miscon-
duct connected with work, even though the peyote was used as part of a
religious sacramental ceremony.'54 The Court previously had remanded the
case to the Oregon Supreme Court to determine whether the state's criminal
controlled substance laws provided an exemption for the sacramental use of
peyote, reasoning that if the state could criminally prohibit all use of peyote,
it could certainly deny unemployment compensation in all cases of such
use.' Once the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the criminal law
provided no religious exceptions,'56 the issue became whether a religiously
neutral and generally applicable state criminal law burdening religious exer-
cise violated the federal Constitution.'57 The Court held that it did not.5
more precise holding would be that a constitutionally protected free exercise right is
either present or absent. If the Constitution is indeed the supreme law of the land, then
recognizing a right it protects should end the inquiry, precluding government infringe-
ment regardless of the interests at stake. Otherwise, the Constitution is not what it says
it is, and can be trumped by a democratic majority without amendment or by a court
without apology. Such a result is no more justifiable than a holding that the First
Amendment Speech Clause protects speech that the Establishment Clause allows the
government to restrict. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
141 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409.
' Id. at 402-03 (noting that "[t]he door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly
closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such ... [while] overt
acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles . . . '[are] not totally free from legisla-
tive restrictions"') (citations omitted).
"' Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1417 (1990) (listing cases representative of
this trend).
52 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 874.
' Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 672-74 (1988).
156 Employment Div. v. Smith, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
' Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
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Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Smith, began by engaging in the
same historical revision and precedential exploits characteristic of the
Court's Establishment Clause cases."' The Court, in a maneuver designed
to avoid the logical roadblocks on the way to its result, distanced the situa-
tion in Smith from cases in which it had previously struck down religiously
neutral and generally applicable statutes. 6 First, the Court characterized
the issue as one involving a general criminal law rather than an unemploy-
ment compensation case. 6' This characterization supplied the diversion
needed to later distinguish between the unemployment compensation cases
and the other free exercise cases, thus limiting the embarrassing conflict
between Sherbert's logic and the Court's result.'62
Having hidden Sherbert and its progeny in a closet, the Court could then
attempt to support its new test in Smith. Interestingly, Justice Scalia cited
Minersville School District v. Gobitis,163 a case whose reasoning met an
early death after three years. By resurrecting Gobitis, the Court sought to
give authority to its wholehearted deferral to the legislature in matters of
religious conscience, much as it did in other cases that have employed the
Lemon test."6 Turning to its new creation, the Court in Smith indicated
158 Id. at 882.
'5 Id. at 876-82. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
I- Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
161 Id. at 875-76.
162 Id. at 883. The Court attempted to paint Sherbert as a situation in which a neutral
and generally applicable law was not present, reiterating that the Sherbert test "was
developed in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the
reasons for the relevant conduct." Id. at 884. There was no indication in Sherbert, how-
ever, that South Carolina did not impose its Saturday work requirement on every unem-
ployment compensation applicant. The Court presented Sherbert as standing "for the
proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may
not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling
reason." Id. The Court never explained why the Oregon criminal law, which provided a
system of individual exemptions for prescribed uses of substances from a medical prac-
titioner, id. at 874, did not fall within even this narrow reading of Sherbert.
63 Id. at 879 (citing Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940),
overruled by West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
" Justice Scalia has characterized the Lemon test as "some ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeat-
edly killed and buried, . . . stalk[ing] Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again,
frightening the little children." Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2141, 2149 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Apparently, rumors of the death of Gobitis
have also been exaggerated. Little did constitutional scholars realize, until Smith, that
Gobitis, which had been overruled by Barnette, had given life to a stealth body-snatcher
that would slowly take over the very soul of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence,
fully exposing itself fifty years later.
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that it was a sort of "hybrid" beast.'65 Under the new test, with regards to
laws of general applicability, the government action is required to pass the
strict scrutiny test reserved for unemployment compensation cases only
where free exercise is linked with other constitutional protections, such as
free speech.'66 In a fascinating show of paradoxical nerve, the Court cited
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,167 the case overruling
Gobitis, for the proposition that even some free speech cases have involved
combined freedom of religion interests. 6  The Court's elaborate and in-
tense attempt to construct a foundation for its new test, to the point of citing
bad law, presumably must be credited to its own recognition of the novelty
of the structure it created.
With Smith, the free exercise of religion was hobbled to the point of
needing the crutch of free speech or some other right before it could obtain
the status and protection of other fundamental constitutional rights.'69 In
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, v° the Court's latest
free exercise case, Justice Kennedy continued to rely on Smith, attempting to
165 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
'6 Id. at 881.
67 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
161 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624). Although this is true of
the factual context of Barnette, the Court in that case rested its decision on free speech
grounds alone. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633-34. Interestingly, the Court in Smith over-
looked the true wisdom articulated in Barnette:
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought essen-
tial to their time and country have been waged by many good as well as by evil
men.... As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife be-
comes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be.... Those who begin coercive
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.
Id. at 640-41. Thus, the only burial in Barnette was Gobitis's support of uniformity and
sameness, the very attitude that is curiously prevalent in the Court's decision to allow
the legislature to decide what shall be generally applicable. The Court in Barnette rec-
ognized:
We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we
owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnor-
mal attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State .... the price
is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Id. at 641-42. Under Smith's revision of the free exercise test, individuals are seldom
allowed to prove that their eccentricity is harmless to the state. As long as the state's
means are reasonable in light of its ends, free exercise is a mere shadow of freedom.
169 The decision shocked Congress into enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993), to restore religious liberty to its
revered status.
70 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
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give reasonable content to the new standard, 7 1 despite its unstable logic
and the broad criticism it engendered.17 ' Nevertheless, the Smith-Hialeah
sudden about-face in free exercise interpretation, and the Court's unwilling-
ness to recognize the logical matrimony of the two prohibitions of the Reli-
gion Clauses, leaves free exercise and establishment jurisprudence in a rare,
yet ironic, congruence.
"Rather than taking the opportunity to derive narrower, more precise
tests from the case law, [the Supreme Court] tend[s] to continually try to
patch up the broad test[s], making [them] more and more amorphous and
distorted.' '7 If the Court's jurisprudence in this area has proven unwork-
able and unfaithful to the purposes of the Religion Clauses, the Court should
forthrightly recognize this development and make use of the opportunity the
Rosenberger case presents. In the past, the Court has employed a test that is
more consistent with the original purposes of the Religion Clauses, and that
provides a more workable framework for determining when government can
legitimately employ religious classifications. Partial application of the test
was found in the faithful and sensible application of the effect prong of
Lemon as recognized by the Court in Widmar v. Vincent, 74 Mueller v. Al-
len, 17  and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.76 Justice
Brennan cogently explained this test in McDaniel v. Paty. Other than
Lemon and its misguided and confusing progeny, the Supreme Court's pre-
cedents have adhered consistently to a view that equality of voluntary reli-
gious choices, whether of nonreligion or a diversity of religious beliefs, is
the better and intended understanding of the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses. 7 1
171 Id. at 2226.
172 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 159; Richard J. Neuhaus, A New Order of Reli-
gious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 620 (1992); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and
Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149 (1991).
"' Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2499 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
r g 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
171 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
176 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
177 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); see infra note
183 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, throughout his tenure on the Court, Justice
Brennan was uniquely representative of the trend of the majority-doing not as he stat-
ed, but as his desired results dictated. Often, in cases before and after McDaniel, his
logic failed to live according to the standard required by his own language in McDaniel.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
694 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 770 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 373 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
178 For a general discussion of the Religion Clauses, see CHESTER J. ANITEAU ET AL.,
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III. THERE AND BACK AGAIN: EQUALITY AND ITS PLACE THROUGHOUT
OUR HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
In McDaniel v. Paty,'79 Justice Brennan presented an interpretation of
the Religion Clauses, gleaned from Supreme Court precedents, that is faith-
ful to the historical understanding and proper harmony of the First Amend-
ment:
Beyond the[] limited situations in which government may
take cognizance of religion for purposes of accommodating
our traditions of religious liberty, government may not use
religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of
duties, penalties, privileges or benefits. "State power is no
more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to
favor them.""18
The principle of equality of religious exercise should replace Lemon as
guiding "[t]he general nature of [the Court's] inquiry in this area." '81
A. The Founders Understood the Equality Principle of Religious Liberty
"No one questions that the Framers of the First Amendment intended to
restrict exclusively the powers of the Federal Government."'82 The real is-
sue is whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the restrictions of
the First Amendment Religion Clauses apply to the states. The historically
accurate and honest view is that the Constitution was amended by the Court
in 1940, and not by the people.'83 Yet, despite what has been described as
FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT (1964); SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902); ROBERT H. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); THOMAS J. CURRY, THE
FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1986); MARK D. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965);
Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of
the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839 (1986);
McConnell, supra note 151; Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of
Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986); Note, Rethinking the Incorpora-
tion of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700 (1992).
179 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
80 Id. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)) (footnote omitted).
... Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983).
82 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
183 In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court stated that "[t]he
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the Court's "superficial and purposive interpretations of the past ... [which]
ha[ve] dishonored the arts of the historian and degraded the talents of the
lawyer,"' 4 a principled interpretation of the Religion Clauses can be sal-
vaged. Regardless of whether one believes that the First Amendment should
have been incorporated to apply to the states, the Framers' views of the
relationship between, and substance of, the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses should inform the Supreme Court's interpretive jurisprudence. 85
If George Washington is the father of our country and James Madison
the father of the Constitution, Roger Williams can be called the father of the
principle of religious equality. After banishment from Massachusetts for his
radical ideas about the purity of the Church and its autonomy from govern-
ment, Williams went to Rhode Island to begin a great experiment, the first
of its kind.'86 On August 20, 1638, the men of Providence agreed upon a
compact which would grant equal religious liberty to all by submitting
themselves to the will of the government organized for the public good, but
only in civil matters.'87 This experiment was unique.
fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.... The Fourteenth Amendment has ren-
dered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact [laws abridging
First Amendment liberties]." Id. at 303 (footnote omitted). The Court failed to provide
any historical support for this proposition. Indeed, it has never provided any persuasive
evidence that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant for it to incorporate the
protections and prohibitions of First Amendment, or any other amendment, to the states.
See generally Note, supra note 178.
'u HOWE, supra note 178, at 4.
185 See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2506 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) ("Once this Court has abandoned text and history as guides, nothing prevents it
from calling religious toleration the establishment of religion."); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he mean-
ing of the [Establishment] Clause is to be determined by reference to historical practices
and understandings."); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he line
we must draw between the permissible and impermissible is one which accords with
history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers. It is a line
which the Court has consistently sought to mark in its decisions expounding the reli-
gious guarantees of the First Amendment."); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8
(1947) ("Whether this ... law is one respecting an 'establishment of religion' requires
an understanding of the meaning of that language .... [T]herefore, it is not inappropri-
ate briefly to review the background and environment of the period in which that con-
stitutional language was fashioned and adopted."); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) ("If we pass ... to a view of American life as ex-
pressed by its laws, its business, its customs and its society, we find everywhere a clear
recognition of the same truth ... this is a Christian nation.").
186 See Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundation of Religious Liberty, 71
B.U. L. REv. 455, 465-69 (1991).
" Id. at 475.
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It was not toleration in the narrow sense of benevolent non-
interference by an authority that refrained from exercising its
reserved right, that Roger Williams was interested in; it was
rather religious liberty as a fundamental right, that had never
been surrendered to the civil power, that lay beyond its juris-
diction and was in no way answerable to it .... 1
88
Williams's views were not important simply because they were at the foun-
dation of religious liberty in the New World. They are specifically relevant
in understanding the meaning of the Religion Clauses drafted a century after
his death because his views were "picked up by Baptists and other pietists
in late eighteenth-century America, groups without whose advocacy the First
Amendment probably would not have been adopted."'89
When examined, Roger Williams's ideas of the respective spheres of
civil and ecclesiastical authority and their impact on religious liberty are
surprisingly similar to ideas later espoused by James Madison. Moreover,
while the Supreme Court's overworked and inexact metaphor of the "wall of
separation between church and State," is generally credited to Thomas Jef-
ferson, 9' it first appeared in Williams's writings. 9' It is not the meta-
phor which gave birth to Lemon and the other jurisprudential disasters al-
ready discussed; this language, like so much of the Court's other missives,
only became destructive when it obtained an import greater than the sub-
stance and truth it embodied. If the "separation" is viewed from the theolog-
ical and libertarian perspective of Roger Williams, rather than from the
' 1 VERNON L. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT: THE CO-
LONIAL MIND 1620-1880, at 71-72 (1930).
89 John H. Mansfield, Comment on Holmes, "Jean Bodin: The Paradox of Sover-
eignty and the Privatization of Religion," in RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE LAW:
NoMos XXX 71, 76 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988).
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
In a writing entitled Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered,
Roger Williams asserted:
[T]he Church of the Jews... and the Church of the Christians ... were both
separate from the world; and that when they have opened a gap in the hedge or
wall of Separation between the Garden of the Church and the Wilderness of the
world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, etc.,
and made his Garden a Wilderness, as at this day. And that therefore if he will
ever please to restore his Garden and Paradise again, it must of necessity be
walled in peculiarly unto himself from the world; and that all that shall be saved
out of the world are to be transplanted out of the Wilderness of the world, and
added unto his Church or Garden.
ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON'S LETTER LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED AND AN-
SWERED (1644), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra
note 3, 313, 392 (second emphasis added).
382 [Vol. 4:1
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE FIRST SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH
political perspective of Jefferson, wrought with the anticlerical biases of the
enlightenment, a more comprehensive philosophy of the Religion Clauses
emerges. 9 ' This philosophy, understood by Williams, Madison, and the
citizens who ratified the First Amendment, gives the Religion Clauses a
coherence absent from current Supreme Court jurisprudence.'93
Williams found his philosophy in his faith, believing it "impossible for
any Man or Men to maintaine their Christ by their Sword, and to worship a
true Christ!"'94 As one commentator explained:
Liberty of conscience meant for Williams that no man should
be prevented from worshipping as his conscience directed
him. It also meant that no man should be compelled to wor-
ship against his conscience or to contribute to the support of
a worship his conscience disapproved.
There was one thing government could do, though
few governments had ever done it: government could protect
the free exercise of conscience in religion .... [I]t required a
vigilance and impartiality that were rare among rulers to
watch over the exercise of religion in such a way as to pre-
vent one group within the state from usurping authority over
the consciences of other groups."'
Despite his strong support of liberty, Williams did not support anarchy as
the price of religious freedom. For example, fearing that Catholic allegiance
to a foreign authority might pose security risks for the government because
of contemporary theological and political turbulence in Europe, he supported
certain restrictions upon the freedom of Catholics.'96 Illustrating his philos-
ophy, Williams wrote a letter to the townsmen of Providence suggesting the
following hypothetical:
There goes many a ship to sea, with ... papists and
protestants, Jews and Turks; ... [none should] be forced to
come to the ship's prayers or worship, nor compelled from
See generally HOWE, supra note 178, at 1-10.
'93 For an in-depth analysis of the Court's need for some coherent "constitutional
philosophy" regarding religion, see John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 847 (1984).
194 ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY TENENT YET MORE BLOODY (1652), reprinted in
4 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 515.
19 EDMUND S. MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE 137, 140
(1967).
'96 Id. at 136-37.
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their own particular prayers or worship, if they practice any.
[Nevertheless,] [i]f any of the seamen refuse to perform their
services, or passengers to pay their freight; if any refuse to
help, in person or purse, towards the common charges or
defence; if any refuse to obey the common laws and orders
of the ship, concerning their common peace or preserva-
tion[,] ... the commander or commanders may judge, resist,
compel, and punish such transgressors, according to their
deserts and merits.19 7
Still, for Williams, the vaulted place for freedom of conscience was reserved
exclusively for religious conscience and no other.19 The only possible re-
striction on this equal liberty of conscience in religious matters was the
interest in the common order and safety of society. 199
Like Roger Williams, the ratifiers of our Constitution viewed equality of
religious liberty as a single goal with limitations in only the most compel-
ling circumstances. The First Amendment was a political compromise
among several colonies worried about the power of a centralized govern-
ment encroaching on local beliefs. °° This fear of centralization forced a
compromise among various founding colonial views, ensuring that the pow-
er each independent sovereign gave to the federal government would not be
used to encroach upon the states' respective approaches to religion and
religious freedom. The colonists believed that equal religious liberty was a
singular goal, and that the unique prospect of three sovereigns, the Creator,
the national government, and the state, necessitated a dual protection. When
the differences among the different colonies' treatment of religion are under-
stood, and the history of England's national establishment is considered, one
can understand the fear each colony experienced in risking the creation of a
nationwide civil authority that might encroach upon local religious autono-
my on the one hand, and individual religious freedom on the other.
As the Supreme Court correctly noted in Everson v. Board of Educa-
97 ROGER WILLIAMS, LETTER TO THE TOWN OF PROVIDENCE (Jan. 1655), reprinted
in 6 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 278-79.
'9' ROGER WILLIAMS, THE HIRELING MINISTRY NONE OF CHRISTS (1652), reprinted
in 7 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 179. See general-
ly HOWE, supra note 178, at 6-19. Williams "thought every government was entitled to
impose a rigorous standard of behavior in matters that affected civility, humanity, mo-
rality, or the safety of the state and individuals in it, but no standard at all in religion."
MORGAN, supra note 195, at 136.
199 See WILLIAMS, supra note 197, at 278-79.
200 See ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 178, at 30-61; CORD, supra note 178, at 14-15;
HOWE, supra note 178, at 20-23, 30-31, 70. See generally Fairman, supra note 178;
Note, supra note 178.
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tion, °' "[n]o one locality and no one group throughout the Colonies can
rightly be given entire credit for having aroused the sentiment that culminat-
ed in adoption of the Bill of Rights' provisions embracing religious liber-
ty."202 Thus, the views of Virginia's leaders should be relevant to a deter-
mination of their respect for the equality of each colony to be free from an
establishment of religion at the hands of the others, and each citizen to be
free from federal actions restricting religious freedom. Conveniently,
Madison's views of religious freedom epitomized these notions. He be-
lieved:
[E]quality . .. ought to be the basis of every law .... If "all
men are by nature equally free and independent," all men are
to be considered as entering into Society on equal condi-
tions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore retaining no
less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above all are
they to be considered as retaining an "equal title to the free
exercise of Religion according to the dictates of conscience."
Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to
profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be
of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those
whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has
convinced us.2"3
Madison's ideal government was one "best supported by protecting every
Citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which
protects his person and his property; by neither invading the equal rights of
any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of another."2" He took
these views of equality with him when he led the debate over the Bill of
Rights.0 5 Madison, however, simply led the debate; his vote counted no
greater than others participating in the process. Nevertheless, history reveals
that all colonists could agree on that which constituted a "religion," and on
that which was the consistent characteristic of an "establishment." By under-
standing the significance of these two words, and their meaning to the ratifi-
201 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
202 Id. at 11.
203 MADISON, supra note 140, at 300.
204 Id. at 302.
205 As then Justice Rehnquist noted in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), Madi-
son first proposed that the Religion Clauses state that "[t]he civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on
any pretext, infringed." Id. at 94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See gen-
erally id. at 92-100.
1995] 385
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
ers, a cogent explanation of the true principle behind the Religion Clauses is
obtained.
The First Amendment was a contract among the colonies to maintain
their equal rights to treat religion as their respective citizens wished. The
newly created federal government could not choose any state's religious
preferences and attempt to impose them upon the other states.0 The
Founders understood the Religion Clauses to be mutually supportive," 7
prohibiting certain government action which would infringe the overriding
liberty and freedom to make one's own decision regarding religion.2 8 Al-
though the colonies had different experiences with the establishment of reli-
gion, and thus that term meant different things to each, there were general
characteristics of an establishment that gave content to understanding.0 9
Government coercion in matters of religion was the overriding characteristic
of an establishment."' Indeed, Virginia's Declaration of Rights announced
that "religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force
or violence."21' The Supreme Court recognized this essential element of an
establishment of religion in its Religion Clauses cases until 1962, when the
Court laid the foundations for Lemon, and solidified the future trend towards
avoiding and misinterpreting the history of the Religion Clauses.212
206 As the Court observed in Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589
(1845), "[t]he Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respec-
tive states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws: nor
is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect
on the states." Id. at 609.
207 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
208 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2, at 1156-57
(2d ed. 1988).
209 Among the general characteristics of an establishment were:
1. A state church officially recognized and protected by the sovereign;
2. A state church whose members alone were eligible to vote, to hold public
office, and to practice a profession;
3. A state church which compelled religious orthodoxy under penalty of fine
and imprisonment;
4. A state church willing to expel dissenters from the commonwealth;
5. A state church financed by taxes upon all members of the community;
6. A state church which alone could freely hold public worship and evange-
lize;
7. A state church which alone could perform valid marriages, burials, etc.
ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 178, at 1-2.
210 6 WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION 208-20, 501-06, 523-601, 631-41
(1957); LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 20-30 (rev. 1st ed. 1967). See
generally ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 178; CORD, supra note 178; McConnell, supra
note 151.
2 VA. CONST. art I, § 16, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 311, 312 (Rich-
ard L. Perry ed., rev. ed. 1978) (emphasis added).
212 Compare McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) and Zorach v. Clauson,
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Religious non-coercion, or equality, ensures that there is never an estab-
lishment of religion. This does not imply that there is an establishment if
there is no equality, because equality under the Religion Clauses should be
understood as equality of religious choices, rather than equality of treatment
in every circumstance. Thus while equality of treatment, in and of itself,
proves the absence of an establishment of religion, inequality of treatment is
only an establishment if there is coercion of those not treated equally to
accept a religious choice they would otherwise reject. When one compre-
hends the place that religious belief and exercise played in early America,
and combines this with the notion of equality of religious choices, it be-
comes clear that the ratifiers' equality principle was not breached by the
inclusion of a special exemption for the free exercise of religion.
Under the equality understanding, the Establishment Clause protects
every citizen's right to make voluntary choices regarding religion by for-
bidding the government from using its power to join the marketplace of
ideas on the side of any belief, regardless of whether it favors or disfavors
religion. The Free Exercise Clause complements, rather than conflicts with,
the Establishment Clause; it protects entirely different interests. Virginia, the
only state that had both an establishment clause and a free exercise clause
worded in the terms of "free exercise of religion," defined religion as a
"duty owed to our Creator."'213 Similarly, in the other states, religious free-
dom was understood as the freedom to worship the Creator according to the
dictates of one's conscience.2 '4 Madison explained that the status of this
liberty was "precedent, both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the
claims of Civil Society."2 '5 It was the very fact that such a duty was owed
to a third sovereign, the Creator, that led the ratifiers to adopt a special
place for religious conscience in the First Amendment."6 As one scholar
343 U.S. 306 (1952) and McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) and
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) with Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
23 VA. CONST. art. I, § 16, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 211,
at 217 (emphasis added).
214 See generally McConnell, supra note 151.
215 MADISON, supra note 140, at 299; see also Herbert W. Titus, No Taxation or
Subsidization: Two Indispensable Principles of Freedom of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REV.
505, 507 (1992) ("Both Madison and Jefferson endorsed a legal definition of religion,
which distinguished the exclusive authority of God from the limited authority of man,
and acknowledged the necessary separation of the two.").
26 Justice O'Connor recently evidenced a similar understanding, noting that "[w]hat
makes accommodation permissible, even praiseworthy, is not that the government is
making life easier for some particular religious group as such. Rather, it is that the gov-
ernment is accommodating a deeply held belief." Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481, 2497 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added). That
which Roger Williams made explicit and the Framers understood, Justice O'Connor
overlooked, for the protection of voluntary religious choices requires a special place in
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has noted, this view of the Religion Clauses
consider[s] as religious only those beliefs that affirm the
existence of a spiritual reality. If this definition excludes
some philosophies, that, it may be said, is exactly what the
Constitution intended. A particular importance was attached
to, and a particular problem for government seen in connec-
tion with, a certain belief about reality, and these matters
were addressed in the opening clauses of the first amend-
ment .... If reason and ordinary experience predominate, the
result, it may be said, is not religion for constitutional pur-
poses. Religion requires "faith," and faith moves beyond the
paths of ordinary understanding."7
The ratifiers were familiar with persecution for religious conscience. They
understood the stubbornness of faith and the opposition it produced in those
dissenting against government encroachment in matters reserved to a spiritu-
al sovereign. The particular problem of forming a government of citizens
owing their allegiance to a separate sovereign provided the greatest justifica-
tion for the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Unlike the analysis under the Establishment Clause, the private choices
involved in the free exercise of religion bring with them duties and obliga-
tions that one's conscience feels are owed to a higher authority than govern-
ment. Justice Brennan recognized the distinctiveness of these duties by
suggesting that government may use religion as a classification when seek-
ing to accommodate "our traditions of religious liberty." ' 8 An equality
principle of the Religion Clauses cannot mean that religion can never be
treated differently, because to do so effectively would allow the Establish-
ment Clause to repeal the Free Exercise Clause."1 9 A proper understanding
of the two requires that it not "be ignored that the First Amendment itself
contains a religious classification."220 This lone religious classification,
civil government for "religion." That there may be equally deserving ethical and moral
convictions, or comprehensive belief systems that are just as important to some, is
irrelevant.
21 Mansfield, supra note 193, at 851.
218 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judg-
ment).
2"9 In the Delaware Declaration of Rights, this understanding of equality is illustrated.
In § 2, the "right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship" was specially
protected, while in § 3, "all persons professing the Christian religion" were granted the
protection "to enjoy equal rights and privileges" in the state. DEL. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS §§ 2-3 (Sept. 11, 1776), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note
211, at 338.
220 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting).
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however, does not serve to breach equality for religious or nonreligious
citizens. When the government grants a religious accommodation, whether
out of majoritarian sincerity or constitutional duty, the nonreligious citizen is
not burdened in his religious choice to not exercise religion."'
As Roger Williams elaborated in his hypothetical involving a ship at
sea, there must be some limit even with respect to one's religious duty to
the Supreme sovereign.222 The Framers understood this as well. The last
clause in Virginia's Declaration of Rights alludes to this principle; acknowl-
edging that "it is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance,
love, and charity towards each other." '223 Virginia's Act for Establishing
Religious Freedom acknowledged:
[T]o suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the
field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation
of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a danger-
ous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty....
[I]t is time enough, for the rightful purposes of civil govern-
ment, for its officers to interfere when principles break out
into overt acts against peace and good order.224
Delaware's Declaration of Rights also protected the free exercise of the
Christian religion unless such exercise "disturb[ed] the peace, the happiness
or safety of society." '225 Other states evidenced a similar view of religious
.freedom during the period before ratification of the First Amendment. 6
22 It is, of course, true that government can take action to protect or further religious
liberty even when not obligated to do so by the Free Exercise Clause. This concept is
best summarized by Chief Justice Burger in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664
(1970), where he noted:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been
said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally estab-
lished religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly
proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without spon-
sorship and without interference.
Id. at 669.
222 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
223 VA. CONST. art. I, § 16, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note
211, at 312.
224 An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785), reprinted in VA. CODE ANN.
§ 57-1 (Michie 1986).
225 DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 3 (Sept. 11, 1776), reprinted in SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 211, at 338.
226 For example, Maryland's Declaration of Rights stated:
[W]herefore no person ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate on
account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious practice;
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Thus, the ratifiers of the Religion Clauses understood them to protect the
complete equality of all citizens in the choice of whether to engage in reli-
gious exercise, and the limits placed on that exercise. The free exercise of
religion, however, could not threaten the peace, safety, or good order of
society.
Even if incorporation is viewed as removing the specific federalism
limitation on the First Amendment, it should not change the content of its
limitations. Too often, courts have interpreted the Establishment Clause to
tilt the balance in favor of nonreligious ideas and viewpoints, while reducing
the Free Exercise Clause to meaninglessness. A faithful application of the
Founders' understanding of the Religion Clauses would require the govern-
ment to treat its citizens with a blind eye toward religious adherence, except
in those circumstances where religious liberty is jeopardized. The Supreme
Court should look to the Religion Clauses as understood by the Founders to
clarify its jurisprudence. A study of opinions other than Lemon and its aber-
rant progeny, and the post-Sherbert free exercise cases, demonstrates that
the Court has frequently done just that.
B. The Equality Principle in Supreme Court Jurisprudence
1. The Court's Equal Access Cases
[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny
use to those wishing to express less favored or more contro-
versial views .... Selective exclusions from a public forum
may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified
unless, under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order, peace or
safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others, in their
natural, civil or religious rights
MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS XXXIII (Nov. 3, 1776), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES, supra note 211, at 346, 349. Massachusetts also provided an exception to the
right of free exercise declaring:
[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate,
for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of
his own conscience; or for his religious profession of sentiments; provided he
doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship.
MASS CONST. art II, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 211, at 373,
374. Finally New Hampshire granted "every denomination of christians demeaning
themselves quietly, and as good subjects of the state," equal protection of the law. N.H.
CONST., BILL OF RIGHTS art. VI (June 2, 1784), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBER-
TIES, supra note 211, at 382, 383.
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by reference to content alone.227
This equal protection analysis applies with equal force to religious speech.
In Widmar v. Vincent,228 the Court held that granting student religious
groups equal access to university facilities would not violate the Establish-
ment Clause; accordingly, the Clause provided no valid justification for the
denial of equality to religious groups. 9 Writing for seven members of the
Court, Justice Powell found it "novel" to suggest that religious worship, as
opposed to speech about religion, is not subject to the same equal protection
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.23° Indeed, the Court
has consistently upheld protection for religious speech in a wide variety of'
contexts, with no suggestion that the religious content of that speech in any
way limits the full force of First Amendment guarantees."'
Although finding that equal protection must be afforded to religious
speech, the Court has often hidden Lemon's paradoxical logic under a bush-
el of common sense. The focus has changed from looking for effects that
"advance" religion, to looking instead at whether the challenged government
action has the effect of fostering religious uniformity or otherwise interfer-
227 Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
228 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
229 Id. at 270-76.
230 Id. at 269 n.6.
231 See., e.g., Lee v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2709 (1992) (per curiam) (striking down ban on distribution of religious literature in
airport terminals); International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2701 (1992) (upholding ban on solicitation at airport terminals); Board of Airport
Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (same); Heffron v. International
Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding limitation on
solicitation at state fairgrounds); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (striking
down restriction on religious speech in public park); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951) (striking down municipal ordinance restricting street preaching); Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (striking down licensing practice for religious speech in
public park); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (striking down limitation on
sound amplification of religious speech in public park); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946) (striking down ban on distribution of religious literature in company-owned
town); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding application of child
labor law to distribution of literature); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
(striking down restriction on door-to-door religious canvassing); Murdock v. Pennsylva-
nia, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down tax on door-to-door religious canvassing);
Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) (striking down permit requirement for door-to-
door religious canvassing); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (striking down pro-
hibition on distribution of religious literature in public places); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (striking down licensing scheme as applied to door-to-door solici-
tation for religious causes); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (same);
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down ban on distribution of
religious literature in public places).
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ing with voluntary choices in matters of religion. Thus, in Widmar, the issue
under the effects test was not "whether the creation of a religious forum
would violate the Establishment Clause," but rather whether the "University
[that] ha[d] opened its facilities for use by student groups ... [could] ex-
clude groups because of the content of their speech. 2 32 The Court was
"unpersuaded that the primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms
of discourse, would be to advance religion. 233 Similarly, in Board of Edu-
cation v. Mergens,3 the Court held that equal access by high school stu-
dents to school facilities for religious purposes was fully compatible with
the Establishment Clause.235 Justice O'Connor emphasized that when the
government treats religious groups equally,
the message is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a
State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to
others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility
toward religion. "The Establishment Clause does not license
government to treat religion and those who teach or practice
it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of
American ideals and therefore subject to unique disabili-
ties." '236
Widmar and Mergens rendered completely untenable any suggestion that
speech by private parties, in government facilities available for use by a
variety of outside organizations, could somehow trigger a violation of the
Establishment Clause.
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District,237 the Court also
required equality of religious access. In Lamb's Chapel, a New York public
school district refused to allow an outside religious organization to use
school facilities during non-school hours on the same basis as other outside
organizations.238 The school district attempted to justify the discrimination
based on the need to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause, because
the group wanted to show a film series on family values and child-rearing
from a religious perspective.239 The Supreme Court held that denying ac-
cess to even non-public forums solely on the basis of the religious perspec-
232 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273.
233 Id.
234 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
235 Id. at 253.
236 Id. at 248 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
237 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
238 Id. at 2142.
239 Id. at 2144-45.
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tive of the speech was unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination."'
Leaping over Lemon in a single bound, the Court had "no more trouble than
did the Widmar Court in disposing of the claimed defense on the ground
that the posited fears of an Establishment Clause violation [were] unfound-
ed." 2
41
It is important to note why the Court rejected the states' repeated efforts
to justify their discrimination on the asserted need to avoid an establishment
of religion. In Widmar, Justice Powell agreed that an interest in complying
with "constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling. It [did]
not follow, however, that an 'equal access' policy would be incompatible
with" the Establishment Clause. 2  The Court was particularly impressed
with the fact that the government benefit was open generally, and equally, to
nonreligious organizations.243 Sensibly and faithfully applying the language
of Lemon's effects test, the Court could not find an advancement of religion
when a broad range of organizations equally enjoyed the government's
benefits.21 Without a showing of inequality-a domination by religious
groups in enjoyment of the government access-there was no Establishment
Clause violation.
Mergens and Lamb's Chapel, while adopting the reasoning of Widmar,
cut back on its limitations of the equality principle to provide more room for
expression of religious sentiments and exercise of religious worship. In
finding the Equal Access Act241 consistent with the restrictions of the Es-
tablishment Clause, the Mergens Court noted that "neutrality" required equal
access; anything less would "demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward
religion. 2 46 The Court warned that any effort to enforce the discrimination
by defining religion out of the forum would not be countenanced.24 7 As in
240 Id. at 2147.
141 Id. at 2148.
242 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271. In trying to squeeze the equality principle within the
triangular limits of Lemon, the Court reinterpreted the holding of Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1970). There, the Court had said that the Establishment Clause would not
permit government to fund, on an equal basis with nonreligious universities, the con-
struction of buildings at religious universities that might, at some point in the future, be
used at any time for religious purposes. Id. at 683. Reinterpreting Tilton slightly, the
Court in Widmar suggested that use of such buildings as a forum "equally open to
religious and other discussions" would not violate the Establishment Clause. Widmar,
454 U.S. at 272 n.12.
243 Id. at 274.
244 Id. at 273-75.
245 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988). The Act requires that public secondary schools
receiving federal funds treat all student organizations, including religious organizations,
the same as other noncurriculum related organizations when the school creates a limited
open forum. Id. § 4071(a). The only differential treatment arises from administrative
limitations designed to avoid government entanglement with religion. Id. § 4071(c)(3).
246 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248.
247 Id. at 244. Compare the Fourth Circuit's approval of the University of Virginia's
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Widmar, the Court's Establishment Clause discussion only briefly touched
upon Lemon's purpose prong,248 focusing instead on the primary effect of
the Act. The Court noted the "crucial difference between government speech
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private
speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect." '249  While using problematic "endorsement" language,25 ° the
Court nevertheless reaffirmed the special place religion holds in the Consti-
tution, sometimes enjoying the protection of both the Free Exercise Clause
and Free Speech Clause. Driving home the sound logic that an establishment
of religion cannot exist if there is equality of treatment, the Court empha-
sized that "[t]he proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail
to censor is not complicated."25'
In cutting back the limitations left in Widmar, the Court in Mergens
found no problem in the Act's requirement that equality be granted even
when there is only one other noncurriculum-related student group enjoying
the benefits of the limited public forum.252 The Court further broadened
the equality principle in Lamb's Chapel, barely mentioning Lemon, while
definitional maneuvering in Rosenberger. There, the university defined religion and
politics as subjects not contributing to the "educational mission" of the university.
Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 284 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 115
S. Ct. 417 (1994). The Fourth Circuit deferred completely to the university's definition
even though subjects about religion and politics were taught at the school. Id. This
allowed the university to define its way out of the requirements of the First Amend-
ment. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
248 The Court recognized the limitations of the purpose prong in at least three in-
stances. First, the Court, in interpreting the language of the Act, refused to rely on the
legislative history, calling such a reliance in the circumstances "hazardous at best."
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 242. The Court acknowledged that both sides could cite to legisla-
tive history supporting their arguments. Id. at 238. Second, even though ending unequal
treatment of religion "advances" religion, the Court approved of Congress's clear pur-
pose to end discriminatory treatment of religion. Id. at 239. Finally, the Court noted that
"[e]ven if some legislators were motivated by a conviction that religious speech in
particular was valuable and worthy of protection, that alone would not invalidate the
Act, because what is relevant is legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly reli-
gious motives of the legislators who enacted the law." Id. at 249; cf supra notes 44-60
and accompanying text.
249 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250.
250 See id. at 262 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Because of the reservations
of Justices Kennedy and Scalia about the "endorsement" language, as opposed to the
more historical and logically supportable "coercion" test, the endorsement reasoning
was approved by only a plurality.
25 Id. at 250.
212 Id. at 235-36. The Court did note later the breadth of student groups in the limited
public forum, but this came more as an aside towards the end of the opinion, and the
Court never suggested that the Act's application would be unconstitutional in a more
limited circumstance. Id. at 252 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263).
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extending equal protection to non-student religious groups during nonschool
hours in even nonpublic forums.253 Relying exclusively on free speech cas-
es that prohibited content and viewpoint based discrimination, the Court re-
fused to justify religious discrimination on the basis of the Establishment
Clause."4
At a minimum, the Widmar-Mergens-Lamb 's Chapel line of cases clear-
ly holds that the First Amendment precludes any governmental effort to
single out and censor, or otherwise burden, the speech of private parties
solely because that speech is religious. Significantly, the Court recognized
that through the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment requires that
states treat religious speech, including religious worship that constitutes
speech, as deserving of equal treatment under the Free Speech Clause. Lest
one suggest that the equality principle is limited to the Widmar-Mergens-
Lamb's Chapel type of speech situation, an analysis of a growing number of
cases demonstrates that the Court has a broad understanding of the equality
principle that embraces protection of nonspeech activity.
2. Equality in Nonspeech Cases
As the Court has retreated from Lemon in cases that directly challenge
state action under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, it also has
recognized equality as the governing principle for analyzing the Religion
Clauses. Beginning with McDaniel v. Paty,2" the Court began to sidestep
Lemon's constraints when addressing religious liberty issues. In finding that
Tennessee could not condition service in its state legislature on the surren-
der of the right to be a member of the clergy, the plurality viewed the state
as "punishing a religious profession with the privation of a civil right." '256
Rejecting the state's contention that the Establishment Clause required the
discrimination, Justice Brennan explained:
The mere fact that a purpose of the Establishment Clause is
to reduce or eliminate religious divisiveness or strife, does
not place religious discussion, association, or political par-
ticipation in a status less preferred than rights of discussion,
association, and political participation generally.
... Religionists no less than members of any other group
253 Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147-48.
254 Id. at 2148.
255 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality op.).
216 Id. at 626 (quoting James Madison, Observations on Jefferson's Draft of a Consti-
tution for Virginia (ca. Oct. 15, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1788-89,
at 281, 288 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds. 1977)).
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enjoy the full measure of protection afforded speech, associ-
ation, and political activity generally. The Establishment
Clause ... may not be used as a sword to justify repression
of religion or its adherents from any aspect of public life.57
Expanding on the equality basis for the Court's decision, Justice White
suggested that the state law should be found "unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." '58
As the Court has turned to an equality reasoning under the Religion
Clauses, the focus has been on the "benefit" of a law as it relates to compa-
rable benefits made generally available. Larson v. Valente"' provided the
natural bridge over which religious equality could travel from the Free
Speech Clause to the Establishment Clause. Citing Widmar, the Court in
Larson subjected a statute to strict scrutiny because it imposed greater ad-
ministrative burdens on those religious groups that solicited more than fifty
percent of their funds from nonmembers, while not imposing a comparable
burden on other religious groups. 6 Finding the statute to be a violation of
the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan explained:
Madison once noted: "Security for civil rights must be the
same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in
the multiplicity of interests and in the other in the multiplici-
ty of sects." Madison's vision-freedom for all religion
being guaranteed by free competition between reli-
gions-naturally assumed that every denomination would be
equally at liberty to exercise and propagate its beliefs. But
such equality would be impossible in an atmosphere of offi-
cial denominational preference. 6'
Likewise, in Mueller v. Allen,26 a state statute that provided tax de-
ductions for school expenses to parents of children attending public and
private schools was found not to violate the Establishment Clause. 63 Then
Justice Rehnquist explained:
Just as in Widmar v. Vincent, where we concluded that the
257 Id. at 640-41 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).
258 Id. at 643 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
259 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
260 Id. at 246-47.
261 Id. at 245 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 326 (James Madison) (H. Lodge
ed., 1908)).
262 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
263 Id. at 390-92.
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State's provision of a forum neutrally "available to a broad
class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers" does not
"confer any imprimatur of state approval," so here: "[t]he
provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an
important index of secular effect."264
Similarly, in Bowen v. Kendrick,265 the Court noted that it "ha[d] never
held that religious institutions [were] disabled by the First Amendment from
participating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs." '266 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist summarized this view of neutrality in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District:67
We have never said that "religious institutions are disabled
by the First Amendment from participating in publicly spon-
sored social welfare programs." For if the Establishment
Clause did bar religious groups from receiving general gov-
ernment benefits, then "a church could not be protected by
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk
kept in repair." Given that a contrary rule would lead to such
absurd results, we have consistently held that government
programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of
citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily
subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because
sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial
benefit.26
8
In the Court's latest Establishment Clause case, all nine justices agreed with
this principle of equality. 269 As Justice Kennedy explained:
264 Id. at 397 (citations omitted).
265 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
266 Id. at 609; see also Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
487 (1986) (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 782 n.38 (1973)) (finding fact that state aid was "made available generally
without regard to the sectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited"
central to Court's conclusion that Establishment Clause was not violated).
2167 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
26 Id. at 2467 (citing Bowen, Widmar, Mueller, and Witters) (citations omitted).
269 See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1994) (Souter, J., joined
by Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg, JJ.) (plurality op.); id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 2504 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 2508
(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting). According to Justice
O'Connor, an "emphasis on equal treatment is... an eminently sound approach." Id. at
2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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Whether or not the purpose is accommodation and whether
or not the government provides similar gerrymanders to
people of all religious faiths, the Establishment Clause for-
bids the government to use religion as a line-drawing criteri-
on. In this respect, the Establishment Clause mirrors the
Equal Protection Clause. Just as the government may not
segregate people on account of their race, so too it may not
segregate on the basis of religion. The danger of stigma and
stirred animosities is no less acute for religious line-drawing
than for racial.27
The danger of stigma or animosity is not lessened simply because the reli-
gious segregation results from discrimination in the provision of cash bene-
fits, as opposed to in-kind benefits.
In Rosenberger, the university sought to justify its religious segregation
by drawing a fine distinction between the provision of equal access required
in Widmar and Lamb's Chapel, and the equal provision of general subsi-
dies.27' This strange notion of "neutrality" is out of step with the Court's
trend towards equality after Lemon. The university could not explain how
the inequality in the provision of access forbidden by the Court is not as
"neutral," under its definition, as inequality in the provision of cash. Instead,
the university simply offered a -novel definition of "neutral," meaning dis-
crimination against all religion.272 This is, however, the exact definition of
"neutral" the Court refused to accept in Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's
Chapel.273 The next logical step for religious equality is to extend the neu-
20 Id. at 2504 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
271 Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14,
Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 417 (No. 94-329), certifying
questions to 18 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 1994).
272 See id. at 17.
273 The university tried to save its strained logic by comparing the bus transportation
in Everson to the benefits at issue in Rosenberger. Id. at 18 n. 10. "[B]ecause bus trans-
portation is not a religious activity," id., the university argued that the Court should
swallow its bitter notion of "neutrality," backing up its definition with Lemon and a
long list of its aberrant offspring, id. at 19. The logic is insupportable. The subsidy of
parochial school salaries, Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, the reimbursement of expenses in con-
nection with maintenance and teacher-prepared tests, Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973), and the presence and use of public school personnel on
parochial school premises, School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), inter alia, are not
considered "religious activities," yet all these have been held unconstitutional under the
Lemon test. In fact, unless the university is worried about providing one-tenth of its
blessings to Wide Awake, rather than equal and generally available funds, the provision
of cash is no more a "religious activity" than the examples listed. At base, the
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trality principle to all forms of generally available government assistance, so
as to completely bridge the gap between the Establishment Clause and the
rest of the First Amendment. This does not require a novel construction
project; Lemon, in fact, has smoldered, slowly spreading to consume planks
of equality that the Court had laid throughout its prior interpretations of the
Religion Clauses.
3. Equality before Lemon and Smith
First Amendment decisions prior to Lemon recognized equality as the
governing principle of the Religion Clauses. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,
274
the Court recognized the dual and complementary aspect of the Religion
Clauses:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of
religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and
freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by
law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion. Thus, the Amendment embraces two
concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act.275
The Court's view of equality of religious choice in Cantwell was not itself
new. In 1899, the Court upheld an agreement between the Commissioners of
the District of Columbia and a religiously affiliated hospital whereby the
Federal Government would pay for the construction of a building on the
hospital grounds.276 Without a showing that the hospital discriminated on
the basis of religion or otherwise operated inconsistent with this aid, its reli-
gious affiliation was found to be "wholly immaterial."2"
A commitment to equality of belief continued throughout the Court's
opinions addressing the Establishment Clause. In Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, Justice Douglas wrote that government
university's long list of citations supporting its understanding of "neutrality" is simply a
convenient compilation of the Court's departures from the equality principle since 1971.
For a similar, though not exhaustive, list, see supra note 135.
274 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
275 Id. at 303.
276 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
277 Id. at 298.
278 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans,
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers,
Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of
their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public
welfare legislation .... We must be careful, in protecting the
citizens of [a state] against state-established churches, to be
sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit [the state] from
extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens
without regard to their religious belief.279
Justice Jackson, though disagreeing with the majority's application of this
principle, offered his understanding of the equality notion in the context of
the police and fire protection example: "Neither the fireman nor the police-
man has to ask before he renders aid 'Is this man or building identified with
the Catholic Church?' '
280
Numerous justices consistently have referred to the religious voluntarism
that protects the freedom either to choose a religion or to choose none at all.
In analyzing legislation, Justice Harlan once explained:
This legislation neither encourages nor discourages participa-
tion in religious life and thus satisfies the voluntarism re-
quirement of the First Amendment .... Neutrality in its
application requires an equal protection mode of analysis.
The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of
government categories to eliminate, as it were, religious
gerrymanders.28'
The Court has made it clear that the First Amendment should be viewed as
"mandat[ing] government neutrality between religion and religion, and be-
tween religion and nonreligion."2 2 The Supreme Court's opinions before
Lemon clearly evidence a very different understanding of "neutrality" than
279 Id. at 16. Note that the majority did not distinguish between those general state
law benefits that were in the form of cash and those in the form of access to buildings
or services.
280 Id. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
21 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (empha-
sis added).
28 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 18
("[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a [sic] neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their
adversary. State power is no more to be used to handicap religions than it is favor
them.").
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that approved by the Fourth Circuit in Rosenberger. Instead of barring reli-
gious accommodations, the First Amendment forbids "[a]ny use ... of coer-
cive power by the state to help or hinder some sects or to prefer all reli-
gious sects over nonbelievers or vice versa." '283
Similarly, the Court's encounters with free exercise issues have con-
tained overtures of an equality reading of religious freedom. In Torcaso v.
Watkins,"' the Court held that a notary public could not be denied his
commission because he refused to declare his belief in God.2"5 In holding
that the test oath could not be administered consistent with Torcaso's free-
dom of religion, the Court declared that "[n]either [the State nor the Federal
Government] can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which
aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions
based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded
on different beliefs."2 6 In Larson v. Valente,"7 the Court noted:
[E]quality [for all religion] would be impossible in an atmo-
sphere of official denominational preference. Free exercise
thus can be guaranteed only when legislators-and vot-
ers-are required to accord to their own religions the very
same treatment given to small, new, or unpopular denomina-
tions. As Justice Jackson noted in another context, "there is
no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles
283 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). In Zorach,
the Court upheld a released-time program that allowed public school students to receive
religious instruction off of school grounds during school hours. Id. at 315. Justice Black
argued that the school's actions were not neutral, id. at 319 (Black, J., dissenting), but
never explained how a public school system would be exercising "neutrality" by refus-
ing to allow religious students to leave for religious instruction, when it allowed chil-
dren to leave the premises for a variety of nonreligious reasons. Despite his protesta-
tions of support for neutrality, Justice Black, like Justice Brennan, had difficulty re-
maining faithful to the logical import of his own language. See supra note 177. Perhaps
more than anyone on the Court, it was Chief Justice Burger, the author of Lemon, who
learned of the dangers of language in this area of constitutional adjudication. See
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 419 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (expressing the
view that "the Court's obsession with the criteria identified in Lemon ... has led to
results that are 'contrary to the long-range interests of the country"') (citations omitted);
see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 89 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[O]ur
responsibility is not to apply tidy formulas by rote; our duty is to determine whether the
statute or practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion.").
28 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
28 Id. at 495-96.
286 Id. at 495.
287 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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of law which officials would impose upon a minority must
be imposed generally. 2
88
Because free exercise of religion may compel different duties for different
religious beliefs, this equality is best preserved by providing for consistent,
predictable, and equitable standards for granting accommodation, whether
through legislative or judicial relief.289 Thus, in the area of free exercise,
equality is a way of "identifying workable limits to the government's license
to promote the free exercise of religion.
290
The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment sometimes
compels the government to grant exemptions from generally applicable laws
to religious adherents in order to permit the free exercise of their reli-
gion.29' Moreover, government may accommodate religious individuals in
this way, even when not compelled to do so, without violating the equality
required by the Establishment Clause.292 The accommodation, brought
about in an effort to respect "our traditions of religious liberty," 293 does
not violate the principal of equality commanded by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Absolute equality of treatment has never been constitutionally mandated.
As the Court has explained:
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immate-
rial. The protection afforded by the First Amendment is not
so restricted. A license tax certainly does not acquire consti-
tutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected
by the First Amendment along with the wares and merchan-
dise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike. Such
equality in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom
of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a
preferred position. 94
288 Id. at 245-46 (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
289 See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2503 (1994) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in judgment).
290 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
291 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
292 See, e.g., Corporation for Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (finding "ample room for accommodation of
religion under the Establishment Clause"); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
480 U.S. 136, 145-46 (1987); Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
293 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judg-
ment).
294 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). The Court has not always
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Equality of religious free exercise must mean that the government show no
favoritism in granting exemptions or accommodations based on religious
obligations and duties. "Not every religion uses wine in its sacraments, but
that does not make an exemption from Prohibition for sacramental wine-use
impermissible .. ..""' This does not mean that an exemption for Catholic
use of wine impermissibly discriminates against Protestants. Equality must
be analyzed with a view toward the process and practice of granting such
exemptions, not in the context of the specific exemption or accommoda-
tion.296 Thus, there is no inequality on the basis of religious exercise. Sim-
ilarly, although religion and religious adherence may be the basis of a clas-
sification in this instance, it does not mean that religious adherents and
nonreligious citizens are treated unequally. The nonreligious citizen is in
essentially the same position as the religious citizen who does not need an
accommodation for sacramental wine use; his freedom to choose not to
exercise religion is not hindered by the government's accommodation of
another.297
The Court, like the ratifiers of the Religion Clauses, has recognized a
small exception to this principle of equality of religious freedom. Almost in
the same language used by the states before ratification of the Bill of
Rights, the Court has long enforced the narrow exception to free exercise in
the acknowledgment that the health, safety, and welfare of society may
justify suppression of even religious freedom. In Reynolds v. United
States,29 the Court upheld a conviction of polygamy in the Utah Territory
recognized this revered status for religious liberty. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 263-64 (1934); Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). There is, however, no more reason to
sanction an erroneous interpretation of free exercise than there is to accept Lemon and
the Court's unwise stewardship of the Establishment Clause.
295 Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296 Although they disagree on the application of this principle, the eight justices of
the Court who have addressed the issue agree that equality of accommodation of reli-
gious freedom is required by the First Amendment. See id. at 2491 (Souter, J., joined
by Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg, JJ.); id. at 2503 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in judgment); id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Kennedy, in
order to determine whether there is an equality of accommodation, a "court would have
only to determine whether the [religious] community does indeed bear the same burden
on its religious practice" as the one receiving the initial accommodation. Id. at 2503
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see also id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
297 See id. at 2505-16 (S6alia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has explained concisely
the rationale underlying the equality principle of religious voluntarism. Arguing that the
majority was wrong in its application of equality in Grumet, he suggested that "when
there is no special treatment there is no possibility of religious favoritism; but it is not
logical to suggest that when there is special treatment there is proof of religious favorit-
ism." Id. at 2510 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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despite the testimony that the defendant was compelled by his religious
faith, upon penalty of eternal damnation, to engage in polygamy if the op-
portunity arose.299 Rather than tersely dismissing the defense, the Court
engaged in an elaborate discussion of the meaning of religion, the dangers
of polygamy, and the justification for Congress's jurisdiction to criminalize
the practice.3"' Concluding that polygamy "has always been odious among
the northern and western nations of Europe," punishable in Europe and the
United States at various times with death, the Court rejected the plea for a
special exemption to protect religious freedom.30 '
Frequently the Court has recognized the obligation of the government to
protect the general public, sometimes at the expense of individual liberty
and freedom. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,3 2 a personal exemption from
the requirements that all adults be given vaccinations was denied in light of
the grave interest in eradicating a serious health risk.30 3 Justice Harlan ex-
plained the interests at stake:
There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may
assert the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute
the authority of any human government, especially of any
free government existing under a written constitution, to
interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true
that in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members the rights of the indi-
vidual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pres-
sure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the gen-
eral public may demand."
The very purpose of the strict scrutiny test is to weigh these important
interests, repressing religious liberty only when a sufficiently important
public need is shown. The Court demonstrated its fundamental misunder-
standing of the purpose of the strict scrutiny test when it attempted to limit
its application in Employment Division v. Smith.3"5 A return to a common
sense interpretation of the Establishment Clause, in which religious freedom
yields only to the most compelling of governmental interests, is required to
return religious liberty to its proper constitutional status and to remove reli-
299 Id. at 166-67.
"0 Id. at 162-67.
301 Id. at 164.
302 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
303 Id. at 37.
'04 Id. at 29.
305 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see supra notes 152-69 and accompanying text.
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gious segregation from public life. This can only occur with an application
of the original understanding of the Religion Clauses as a guarantee of
equality of religious choices.
IV. CONCLUSION
Viewing problems of establishment and free exercise through the lens of
equality of religious choice brings into sharpened focus the original meaning
of the Religion Clauses, and demonstrates that nonestablishment and free
exercise are but two sides of the same coin used to purchase liberty of
voluntarism in the area of religion. This was the view of religious liberty
envisioned by the Framers of the First Amendment, and consistently respect-
ed by the Court's Religion Clauses cases before the aberrational decisions of
Lemon and Smith. It is the view nurtured in various areas of the Court's
Free Speech, Establishment, and Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence since
McDaniel v. Paty. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will take the opportunity
presented by its review of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rosenberger to
return to the historical underpinnings of the Religion Clauses by removing
the judicial deviations that spoil the picture of equality.
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